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Write in haste; repent at leisure. When I was invited to this conference I asked when papers were
needed by. I was told at that point – October, 2003 – it was not envisaged that papers would be required
in advance. I relaxed. Early in 2004, I was told, as we all were, that papers were required by 16 March.
Panic. Consequently this paper has been written rather hastily and has not benefited from either
friendly (or hostile) fire. I look forward to critical comment and hopefully thereafter an improved
version. Draft only; not to be quoted or reproduced without the author’s permission.
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Introduction
Law and Development did not start in the 1960s when American legal scholars
discovered the developing world nor did it end in the 1970s when, starved of funds to
pursue their endeavours, many of those same scholars declared that law and
development was dead1. If we are to write about the future of law and development
we must first be clear about its scope, its past and its present. We must first answer the
questions: What is it? What are we? Where are we? How did we get here? Only then
can we answer the question: Where should we go?
Is there such a distinctive phenomenon in practice as ‘law and development’? Isn’t all
law directed towards some kind of development in the sense that new law – judicial
decisions, legislation, administrative directives – change the existing law and so is a
development from that existing law and in changing the existing law, change, in
howsoever slight a degree, the economy and society of which the law is a part. The
changes in the law governing corporations in the USA in the wake of Enron is a clear
example of the use of law to attempt to change, for the better, corporate behaviour.
The forthcoming Planning and Compensation Act in the UK billed as the most
fundamental change to the system of town and country planning since the modern
system was introduced in 1947 is specifically designed to bring about fundamental
changes in administrative and political behaviour and planning culture in relation to
land development. It is for our purposes immaterial whether these two legislative
reforms will be ‘successful’ however that notion is measured; the point is that in two
mature Western liberal democracies (sort of) professional politicians, administrators
and legislators have a very strong belief in the efficacy of law reform as a way to
bring about change for the better or…development.
If then there is a distinctive phenomenon of L&D as it has been used for 40 years in
scholarly literature the two words ‘law’ and ‘development’ or rather the combined
words ‘lawanddevelopment’ are being used in a special sense. They are not just
referring to the use of legislation – and it is nearly always legislation – in order to
achieve certain specific economic or social ends. The fundamental characteristic of
L&D as an approach to law making and writing about law making has been its
external imposition both in respect of law and of development. The law which is
designed to bring about development is for the most part a law based on one designed
1

For a good short summary of the American ethnocentric position on the rise and fall of the law and
development movement, Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Towards a New Paradigm
for Law and Development, 108 Yale LJ, 1, at pp. 11 – 13, (1998)
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and used in countries in the North and the development which is to take place is
development in countries in the South and the aim of that development is to make
those countries in the South more like countries in the North so as to facilitate
economic and social interaction a.k.a. exploitation between North and South. It is
significant that legal developments in Eastern and Central Europe in the postcommunist era are not seen or written about as L&D while legal developments in new
Central Asian states are. European states are very definitely Us; Central Asian states
are very definitely the Other and L&D is about Us and the Other.
I have suggested that the law in L&D is nearly always legislation of Northern
provenance as opposed to legislation of Southern provenance or judicial decisions or
customary law – the latter being very definitely the law of the Other. But what is
development or rather, what is the meaning of ‘development’ in the phrase ‘law and
development’; how have the L&D community perceived and used the term
‘development’? There is not the space here nor do I have the competence to essay a
survey of the various meanings of development which have been part of the currency
of the development industry for the past 40 years but clearly some meaning must be
ascribed to it for any kind of analysis and survey of the field of L&D to be
undertaken.2
The meaning of development
Rather than attempting my own classification, I am content to make use of Leftwich’s
pellucid survey.3 He first of all sets out the “antecedents of the development idea” and
suggests that:

2

Rather surprisingly, L&D writers appear to shy away from addressing this issue. The ILC’s Report
Law and Development: The Future of Law and Development Research, (ILC, New York 1972) ignored
it. Chua, supra, note 1 in a very comprehensive article does not consider the matter. Siedman’s two
path-breaking books did not: R. Seidman, The State, Law and Development (Croom Helm, 1978) and
A. Seidman and R. Seidman, State and Law in the Development Process, (Macmillan, 1994). To take
just two recent multi-authored works containing a of 41 papers covering a very wide range of topics on
law and development which did not consider the matter: J. Faundez, M.E. Footer, and J.J. Norton, (eds)
Governance, Development and Globalization, (Blackstone, London, 2000); C. Antons, (eds) Law and
Development in East and South East Asia, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). K. de Feyter, World Development
Law (Intersenta, Antwerp, 2001) has a first chapter ‘Defining Development’ but it is limited in the
author’s words to analysing “the current concept of development as endorsed by the United Nations”,
i.e. it is concerned with the international legal meaning of development which although useful is too
narrow for purposes of this paper. One of the few L&D writers who have addressed this issue is F.G.
Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, (1980) 14 Law and Society Review,
723.
3
A. Leftwich, States of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development, (Polity, Cambridge,
2000), chaps 2 and 3.
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most major understandings of development can be located within one or more
of the following broad approaches:
•
development as historical progress
•
development as the exploitation of natural resources
•
development as the planned promotion of economic and (sometimes)
social and political advancement)
•
development as a condition
•
development as a process
•
development as structural change
•
development as modernization
•
Marxism and development as an increase in the forces of production4

He goes on to note that the colonial enterprise has always focused in practice on the
second of the above approaches even though the rhetoric of empire came ultimately to
include the notion of the welfare of the colonised in its objectives.5 Included as part of
the justification for empire however was development as structural change and as
modernisation and “preoccupations with growth, modernization and structural change
were the tributaries that fed the dominant orthodoxy about the meaning and purpose
of development in the developing world in the immediate post-war world.”6
From the 1960s onwards, however these dominant conceptions of development began
to be undermined. The notion of social development began to be developed and found
its “most substantial institutional expression in existing and newly established UN
institutions…such as the UNDP (set up in 1965).”7 Other ideas rapidly emerged:
• ‘another development’ which called for transformations of socio-economic and
political structures both within states and at the international level8;
• development as the satisfaction of basic human needs (BHN)9 which focused
on basic goods for family consumption; basic services, participation in decision
making; the fulfilment of basic human rights and productive employment;

4

Op. cit., p.17.
He makes the interesting point that whereas the British Colonial Development Act 1929 has as its
objectives “aiding and developing agriculture and industry in certain colonies, the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act 1940 which replaced that Act “sought to make provision for ‘promoting
the development of colonies, protectorates, protected states and mandated territories and the welfare of
their peoples (emphasis added). Similar thinking was found in France. But the idea that development
was about contributing to the welfare or social development of colonial people was a weak impulse.”
(p.20). He notes that the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement in 1945 concentrated solely on
encouraging the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries.
6
Op. cit, p. 40.
7
Op. cit., p. 43. what follows is based on op. cit. chap.2.
8
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, What Now? The Dag Hammarskjöld Report on Development and
International Cooperation Prepared on the Occasion of the Seventh Special Session of the UN General
Assembly, (Uppsala, 1975).
9
International Labour Organisation, Employment, Growth and Basic Needs, (Geneva, 1976)
5
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•

development as freedom and expansion of choice10; starting as a way of
bringing together social development and BHN development this quickly
expanded into concerns with political freedom, human rights, democratisation
and good governance;
• sustainable development.11
While these have all been influential, Leftwich makes the point that it has been the
World Bank as the major player in the public process of ‘development’ since the
1950s that has had most influence on the meaning and the practice of development.
Initially it focused solely on economic growth but took on social development in the
70s while still seeing the core of development as being economic growth. The sea
change came in the 1980s when the neo-liberal agenda was adopted by the Bank:
Specifically, these [neo-liberal ideas] entailed the bundle of ideas that
economic freedom, free markets, private-sector initiatives and the
cutting away of regulations would provide the conditions and incentives
for unleashing entrepreneurial energies…This thinking about
development re-asserted ‘the primacy of economic growth’ rather than
social development or the elimination of poverty and hence explicitly
rejected the ideas of the 1960s and 1970s which saw a key role for the
state in planning, redistribution and the provision of basic needs.12
By the 1990s however the Bank had re-discovered both a more comprehensive
approach to development and that the state had a role in development: “the state is
central to economic and social development, not as a direct provider of growth but as
a partner, catalyst, and facilitator.”13 From there it has been a short step to an
increasing focus on good government and effective judicial and legal systems as key
determinants of the structural, social and human prerequisites for development.14
Which of the many notions of development have been adopted by the dominant
external voices and actors in the L&D community? Given that the majority of the
external community came into L&D as purveyors of formal law either via legal

10

Leftwich, op. cit. singles out the beginning of the publication of the UNDP’s Human Development
Reports in 1990 and the work of Amartya Sen as being seminal to this approach to development. See
Sen’s Development as Freedom, (Oxford UP, 1999) quoted by Leftwich for the encapsulation of his
(Sen’s) ideas.
11
UN Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, (UN, New York, 1992)
12
Leftwich, op. cit. p.49
13
World Bank, World Development Report, (Washington, D.C., 1997) p.1
14
J.Wolfensohn, A proposal for a comprehensive development framework, (World Bank, 1999).
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education or via advice as consultants or both and that the content and structures of
debates on L&D were set in the 1960s and have not really altered since then, I would
argue that we have never got much beyond the 1960s “dominant orthodoxy” of
growth, structural change and modernisation and even now, when we are concerned
with good government, human rights and the rule of law, our context is still structural
change and modernisation. Yes, we believe in BHN, in sustainable development, in
development as freedom but for us this will be brought about by the careful crafting
and drafting of the appropriate laws, development of the appropriate institutions for
the application of the laws and the handling of disputes, and the propagation, via
teaching and writing, of the appropriate legal skills and techniques and all these are,
by and large, present in the North and need to be transplanted to the South. To the
extent that they are in the South, they are utilised by Northernised Southerners.
The imperial origins of law and development
L&D has always been ‘what we can do for them’ or ‘what they must do at our
bidding/command’ in order to become ‘modern’. When a country develops its law in
a particular way on the basis of its own policies and ideologies that is not usually seen
as L&D; that’s just law or at best law reform. When the Seidmans have a programme
of legal drafting in China15, or McAuslan drafts a land law for Tanzania16 that’s L&D;
when the Chinese have had a major programme since the late 1980s of more or less
rewriting their land law to facilitate a land market, that’s just land law reform and
when the Tanzanians rewrote parts of their land law after independence in the 1960s
to facilitate economic and social development via increased state control and
ownership of land, that was seen from outside the country as not-L&D. L&D is an
external phenomenon; law reform is an internal phenomenon.
Seen in this light, L&D is synonymous with the use of law to further external legal
inputs into societies and that is a somewhat imperial enterprise. Empire goes back a
very long way. Consider the following quotations; the first on the City Planning
Ordinances of the Laws of the Indies; the second on the development of English law
in India and the last two, on the development of English law in Africa:

15

Ann Seidman and Robert Seidman, Drafting Legislation for Development: Lessons from a Chinese
Project 44 Am. J. Int. L. 1. (1996) See too the same authors; Assessing a Bill in Terms of the Public
Interest: the Legislator’s role in the Law Making Process 1 The World Bank Legal Review: Law and
Justice for Development, 207. (2003)
16
Patrick McAuslan, Bringing the Law Back In: Essays in Land, Law and Development, (Ashgate,
2003) Chap. 11
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On 13 July 1573, Philip II issued a comprehensive compilation expanding and
incorporating the previous decrees of Ferdinand and Charles V. What emerged
was a set of 148 Ordinances dealing with every aspect of site selection, city
planning and political organisation; in fact, the most complete set of instructions
ever issued to serve as a guideline for the founding and building of towns in the
Americas…Philip’s compilation reinforced the unilateral objectives of conquest,
emphasised the urban character of Spanish colonisation and specified clearly the
physical and organisational arrangements that were to be developed in the new
cities of America…as Violich has pointed out, ‘then as now, cities were focal
points of the decision-making process; therefore controlling them in a social sense
was the first step to economic and political continuity for those in power.’17
In fact, British trade, expanding British legal control and Indian loyalty to the
British empire were widely understood by colonial administrators as closely
intertwined. Establishing legal authority would make commerce possible;
commerce would in turn solidify colonial rule…In 1860 Indian law was codified
and the role for Hindu and Muslim law restricted…The British used the law quite
purposefully as a vehicle for the creation of conditions they viewed as essential to
Company profits and later, capitalist enterprise – most conspicuously at first a
market in land…18
In Britain’s crown colonies – Freetown, Gambia, the Gold Coast and Lagos –
metropolitan legal jurisdiction was extended in various ways. In the Niger delta,
courts of equity were established in the 1850s to hear property cases, with
jurisdiction over not just Europeans but also Africans involved in property
transactions within British-controlled territory. This and similar moves to extend
jurisdiction to include some Africans were associated with the transition from
slave trading to trade in other commodities (sic)…19
On the civil side [of the law] the African’s inexperience of all the contractual
relations, involved in commercial transactions based on money economy have
made him a stranger to the legal methods in which a modern individualistic
society has expressed its needs. How far is it possible to adjust European
conceptions of law and justice to these conditions of mind…It depends on the
extent to which administrations are determined to impress their own conceptions
of behaviour on Africa…it would not be in the interests of Africa to refrain from
making that gradual advance towards individualisation of property in land which
may lead to improvement in production.20
17

Axel I. Mundigo and Dora P. Crouch, The City Planning Ordinances of the Laws of Indies Revisited,
48 Town Planning Review, 247 at pp. 248, 259. (1977) The authors draw attention to the fact that these
Ordinances were heavily dependent on Roman principles of city planning and that “the objectives of
conquest and empire expansion of the Romans and of the sixteenth century Spaniards were very
similar” .p. 259. what the Spanish (and the authors) call an Ordinance, we would call a section of
clause of an Act of Parliament or a Law.
18
Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures, (Cambridge 2002), pp.151 – 152.
19
op. cit, p.156
20
Hailey, (Lord) An African Survey, (Oxford 1938) pp. 295 – 96.
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Clearly, this paper cannot trace the growth of L&D through successive empires over
the last 500 or so years. The point of these quotations then is twofold. First to make
the point, often overlooked in writing on L&D, that L&D has a long tradition going
back into colonial times which cannot be ignored and second that if I concentrate on
what I know best in L&D – land issues – that too is based on the same tradition –
seizing control of the land and reshaping the land laws to suit the needs of the
dominant power is the essence of the colonial and has continued to be an important
component of the external L&D input into the Other. Nowadays too, reforming land
tenure is hailed as providing one of the building blocks of the rule of law21.
Earlier on I made the point that L&D did not die when interest and funding for it
declined in the US in the 1970s. It is a peculiarly myopic – some might say American
hegemonic – view to assume that once US interest ceases in a subject, the subject
itself ceases to exist. Once we extend the time-span of L&D backwards to the colonial
period, we must also extend the time/space-span to include the actions of the
independent countries themselves in using law to bring about development. L&D in
other words should not be seen just as what we have done for or to the Other; it must
embrace what the Other have done for themselves.
L&D, far from being a somewhat esoteric sub-sub-discipline of the sub-discipline of
law and society, is in fact what happens on a daily basis in legal practice amongst 4
billion or so people all over the world except in Europe, North America and probably
Japan. To put the matter in graphic terms, L&D is not just about US attempts to
introduce securities exchange legislation into Outer Mongolia22 – the inputs of the
external producers of L&D; its about Mongolian reactions to those attempts – the
inputs of the internal consumers of L&D and about Mongolian attempts to reform its
customary land tenure and systems of the settlement of disputes there anent – the
Mongolian state as producer and the Mongolian people as consumers of L&D.
One way to make sense of the large canvas which is claimed for L&D is to attempt a
classification of the phases or ages of L&D since the onset of European empire seen
from the point of view of the external producers and the internal consumers. The

21

P. L. Delville, Rural land tenure renewable natural resources and development in Africa, (Ministère
des Affaires étrangères – Coopération et Francophonie, Paris, 1998) p. 115.
22
Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and
Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 Univ of Penn Jo Int Law, 179, at pp 180 –
81 (1999) for a blackly amusing anecdote on this.
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following table is my attempt at such a classification based largely on the literature of
L&D and of scholars of empire and development23:

23

I only discovered Jensen’s classification of the waves of Rule-of-Law reform when well into this
paper when I read his paper The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: the Political Economy of Diverse
Institutional Patterns and Reformers’ Responses in E.G. Jensen and T. C. Heller, Beyond Common
Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (2003 Stanford UP) pp. 336 – 381 at pp. 345 –
348. The book came into the library of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of
London on 19 February 2004.
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THE EVOLUTION OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
THE EVOLUTION OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
PERCEPTIONS
PHASES
Empire 15th – mid
20th century

The 40s and 50s

The 60s

The 70s

The 80s

The 90s

The 00s

PRODUCERS (EXTERNAL)

CONSUMERS (INTERNAL)

Law in the acquisition of empire.
The use of force to acquire and
maintain empire. State creation; law
and order; acquisition of land and its
productive use; development of legal
systems to facilitate European
commerce.
The decades of benign colonialism.
Use of law at both national and
international levels to provide for the
orderly transfer of power to new
independent states; and to create
rudiments of welfare state: education;
health care
The decade of optimism.
Law and development as part of the
process of throwing off the shackles of
colonialism and building a new polity;
development of legal education and
research; ‘modern’ laws from the
metropolises introduced to provide for
a ‘modern’ society and state.
The decade of disillusion.
Law and development ‘doesn’t work’;
new democratic structures and
practices do not spring up overnight;
transplants don’t work.

Law in the acquisition of empire.
State destruction; breakdown of legal
order; disruption of commerce; land
seizure; unequal application of the
law; colonies as ‘undeveloped estates’;
slavery and forced labour. The use of
force to resist and overthrow empire.
The decades of ‘hanging on’.
Using national and international law as
a tool to prolong colonialism by
purporting to confer rights and
responsibilities
while
ensuring
effective power resided in the
metropolises.
The decade of nationalism.
Law was used to reassert the national
identity, national concerns; repatriate
national assets and a national approach
to exercising political and economic
power
via
autochthonous
constitutions, home-grown political
systems and parastatal authorities.
The decade of consolidation.
National
legal
systems
were
developed, operated and written about
by home-grown lawyers. National
legal solutions to national problems
were developed and brought into
operation.
The limits of legal radicalism.
Law was ignored in the increasingly
lawless competition for power and
access to resources or used as a
weapon in the struggle. Official state
law had less and less relevance to the
lives of the citizen.
The decade of challenge.
Pressures both internal and external,
mount to change the structure of the
state, political and economic systems
and rethink the role of law in these
developments. Constitutional and
economic reforms via law.
The decade of (re)-colonisation.
The imposition of Western law as a
key to re-assert political and economic
control over developing countries; IFIs
and donors require national legal
reforms. International law used to
justify colonial occupation, regime
change, semi-imposed constitutions;
foreign acquisition of national
resources. New states as a colonial
tool? Back to the future?

The decade of neglect but transition.
IFIs and donors did not see law as a
particularly important tool for
development. Academics had better
things to do than work in a field where
there was a paucity of funding. New
approaches began to enter the field.
The decade of (re)-discovery.
Perhaps law is important as a tool for
the development of markets, the key to
‘real’ development and as an input to
good
governance;
re-thinking
transplants – perhaps they do work if
the conditions are right.
The decade of (re)-colonisation.
The importation of Western law as the
key to economic growth and entry into
the global market place. The World
Bank seeks to extend its empire by
appropriating holistic legal system and
‘rule of law’ reform. Law used to
justify colonial re-occupation, new
imposed constitutions, market-led land
reform. New states recognised, elites
and resources appropriated.
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I turn now to try and flesh out this summary classification by reference to practice on
the ground. How has this worked in practice? How has law been used by producers
and consumers to assert or repel the five centuries of law and development. As noted
above, many of my examples will come from the development of laws about land,
both because this is where my own experience has been but also because, as will be
shown, laws and policies about land have been a touchstone through the ages for the
use of L&D.
Empire: mid 15th century – mid 20th century
I have very little practical experience of the use of law in making, retaining and
containing the British empire. But there are enough accounts of the role of law in
European empires – either first hand or based on considerable study – for one to be
able to come to a considered judgement on this matter. It should occasion no surprise
that it is the French sociologist of colonialism René Maunier24 that provides a
conceptual overview of the revolutionary effect of the introduction of French law on
overseas law – an effect which I would argue can be generalised to all European
empires:
The act of passing from oral to written law was a revolution in the form of law. It
passed from traditional to regulational law, from customary to legislative
law…The act of passing from secret to open law, from concealed to public law
was another revolution…The act of passing from parental to national law is a
third and the most fundamental revolution…The great fact of French rule is that
there is now a common, territorial, universal law valid for all, weighing on all, a
national law in the fullest sense, which has nothing to do with kinship, nothing to
do with religious faith, nothing to do with the complex of interwoven bonds which
used to create groups in the colonies…The act of passing from ritual to secular
law is an act closely akin to the preceding…The act of passing from communal to
private law, from collective to personal law is the fifth and last of these legal
revolutions…On the legal plane, the French may be said to have created the
individual…Keeping our minds still on the methods of French action we may sum
up all these phenomena as marking progress from the obscure to the precise…in
24

René Maunier, The Sociology of Colonies, first published in France in 1932: English edition is in two
volumes, edited and translated by E. O. Lorimer, (1949, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul). The
quotation is from Vol. II, pp. 713 – 715. The whole of Volume II is on The Progress of Law. Maunier
also draws attention to the policy of the colonising powers to abrogate customary law usually directly
except the English “who as we know are very chary of interfering with local customs [and] had to take
indirect steps – a thing they are fond of…” (p.504). Maunier here is applying Tönnies’s theories of the
development of law and society from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft in his Communiyt and Association
(1887) to the evolution of law in the colonies, a theory which in many respects was also espoused by
Maine in his Ancient Law (1861). For those wishing to go further back in investigating the use of law
by the rulers of empires, S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires, (1969, Toronto, the Free
Press), pp. 137 – 140.
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doing this, the French are founding the State in the Roman and French
sense…Order, records, taxes: these are the aspects of the State…

And it was a state very different for the most part from those conquered by the
colonial powers. Indeed, it is clear that Maunier did not accord the title of ‘state’ to
any of the countries in the vast areas of the world which France and other European
powers acquired during the 19th century. No more did the Spanish and Portuguese in
America nor the British in Africa though we had a more ambivalent relationship with
‘states’ in the Indian sub-continent.
Maunier explains how law was used to establish a state recognisable to European
thinking ‘overseas’. Abernethy25 provides a theory of why with particular reference to
the exploitation of land. He advances the explore-control-utilise syndrome to explain
European empire-building. I will concentrate on the latter two components of the
syndrome:
Empire builders wanted to possess distant places and people. Possession might
result from subduing others through force but it was perceived as more than sheer
coercive superiority. It had a legal and normative dimension as well, linked to
deeply engrained notions of property. The European state which ensured private
property rights in its domestic domain, felt itself entitled to exercise collective
property rights abroad….
The link between control and utilization was expressed in British colonial
secretary Joseph Chamberlain’s oft-cited reference to the world’s tropical areas as
“undeveloped estates”. Implicit in this phrase is the view that humans enjoy the
privilege but also bear the moral responsibility of turning the potential of their
physical surroundings into something useful to themselves and others…
From phase 1 onward, this argument was advanced by settlers to justify
seizing land from indigenous occupants, expelling “useless” non-European
peoples and forcibly mobilizing their labour. “That which lies common and hath
never beene replenished or subdued is free to any that possesse and improve it”
These words by the Puritan leader John Winthrop summarized the doctrine of
vacuum domicilium according to which undeveloped land occupied by people
could be deemed unoccupied, hence rightfully seized.

The use of law by European empire builders to facilitate development thus
emphasised the creation of the state, the seizure of land, and the development of a
25

David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires 1415 –
1980, (Yale UP 2000) pp. 185 – 188. Phase 1 is a period of expansion of empire from 1415 – 1733. He
quotes comments by Eliot, the British High Commissioner in the East African Protectorate, (later
Kenya) from 1901 – 1904 about taking land from the Maasai as an equivalent example from Phase 3,
1824 – 1912, another period of expansion of empire. See C. Eliot, The East African Protectorate,
(Edward Arnold, 1905) p. 104.
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legal system which facilitated the exploitation of land and labour. The use of law in
relation to land may briefly be commented on. There were in essence three elements
to the legalisation and juridification of land seizure. First, there was the legalisation of
the power of seizure of territory. In what Abernathy refers to as phase 1 of European
empire, there was a tendency to equate the seizure of territory with the seizure of land
and in neither case was it thought necessary to provide a legal justification: as the
quotation from Winthrop shows, seizure of both was based on ethical rather than legal
grounds in the first British empire. In the case of the Spanish and Portuguese empires
however, the papal bulls which authorised the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs to
claim overseas possessions provided a veneer of supranational legal authority to the
later seizures of land.
By the time phase 3 expansion got under way however (and it is the use of law in
phase 3 expansion that has the most direct linkages to L&D), international law had to
be addressed with respect to this first matter. The Berlin Act of 1885 providing for the
partition of Africa by European powers is the most notorious example of international
law being used to provide a legal veneer to the acquisition of territory, a precondition
to the acquisition of land within the territory, but in relation to Africa26 and other parts
of the world acquired during phase 3 empire, agreements and treaties between
European powers recognising each other’s spheres of influence were a constant during
the 19th century and provided an equivalent international legal basis for acquisition.
The second element is the use of law to provide the backing to seize land. In phase 1
empires, as noted above, religion and morality was considered sufficient justification.
By phase 3, law was being added to the equation. On the national front, and confining
myself to the British position, both legal theory and law had caught up with the facts.
Legal theory provided from very early on that “if there be a new and uninhabited land
found by British subjects, as the law is the birthright of every subject, so wherever
they go they carry their law with them”27 ‘Uninhabited’ must be understood as a term
of art: it did not mean empty of people but empty of ‘civilised’ people who recognised
private property rights in land. Even when it became perfectly obvious that there were
people on the land who regarded themselves as having rights in the land, this was
disregarded: it was as Reynolds has put it in relation to Australia: “the theory of an
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uninhabited continent was just too convenient to surrender lightly.”28 So British
settlers could acquire rights in seized land in a colony – freehold estates – by virtue of
the law they carried with them.
British colonial constitutional law addressed the fact of colonial power the same way
as British colonial missionaries addressed women in the colonies: they both had to be
clothed in layers of material so as to hide their nakedness, disguise their true form and
ensure that the proprieties were observed. The law distinguished between different
types of dependencies29. Settlements could be authorised or unauthorised. With
respect to colonies, these were either conquered or ceded. Both however were British
territory. The very peculiar British colonial phenomenon of the protectorate could be
either a protected state or a protectorate; neither were British territory and both came
into being as a result of a ‘treaty’ or agreement between an indigenous30 ruler and the
British government, the difference between them being basically the degree of formal
authority left with the indigenous ruler; that is, did the senior colonial official in the
country tell the ruler what he, the ruler, had to do so that formally, government was
carried on in the ruler’s name or did he act as if there were no ruler that needed to be
consulted or told anything. Different Acts of Parliament applied to the exercise of
imperial powers in colonies and protectorates. With protectorates, the British
government could pretend that it was only in someone else’s country for their own
good.
In colonies the legal problem of land was really no more than asserting some imperial
right to legislate on land seized by settlers and to ensure that in the event of any
conflict with legislation enacted by a colonial legislature, imperial legislation
prevailed. In protectorates, the legal problem was more complex. The theory of
protectorates was that no more power was taken than was necessary to ensure law and
order– the old form of the ‘rule of law’ syndrome. But there were protectorates where
28
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it was clear that there was land that was ‘unoccupied’ (in the sense in which colonies
were found to be ‘uninhabited’) and that the country was suitable for European
occupation. If the agreement which gave rise to the protectorate did not include a
power to deal with “waste and unoccupied land” however, it was legally difficult to
allocate land to settlers. Lawyers in the British government were equal to the task thus
presented to them and came up with an opinion in 1899 that the right to deal with land
in a protectorate “accrued to Her Majesty by virtue of her right to the Protectorate”
since protection in these circumstances involved control over all lands not
appropriated either by the sovereign or by individuals.31 The hypocrisy of the law
equalled the hypocrisy of the moral position espoused by Winthrop and others in
phase 1: the protection involved in a protectorate was the protection of the indigenous
inhabitants of the protectorate from the outside world; apparently this could be best
achieved by enabling their lands to be seized from them32.
The third element in the development of a predatory land law was the creation of a
land law within the dependency which effectively marginalised the indigenous
inhabitants and made it virtually impossible for them to hold on to their land with a
secure tenure. This was achieved by, on the one hand, the development of a land law
modelled on the land law of the imperial power which applied to freehold land (and
its equivalent in other European empires) and on the other, the vesting of land
governed by indigenous law in the colonial government – Crown land in British
dependencies – which could be disposed of by the colonial government with minimal
formality and less compensation since the theory behind this was that the colonial
government was merely succeeding to the radical title to land of the indigenous rulers
and the subjects of those rulers had no security of tenure as they had no recognisable
private rights in the land they occupied.
This period however in which virtually all new states were founded on the basis of
force or fraud – military conquest or so called agreements and treaties with ‘native’
rulers which enabled the ‘peaceful’ acquisition of territory and access to rights to land
– wound down also with the use of force – this time by the colonised to throw off the
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colonial yoke: Indonesia and Vietnam being the two most conspicuous examples, and
within the British empire, Kenya and Cyprus being the best (or worst) examples.
The decade of benign colonialism v the decade of ‘hanging on’: the 40s and 50s
I have suggested in the table that the last decade or so of colonialism was a phase of
benign colonialism when colonial powers used the law for what L&D writers would
recognise as being for developmental purposes – constitutional developments and
national economic and social development through governmental action.33 There was
in fact an overlap with the ending of the long phase of empire as the Second World
War gave rise to different reactions by the different empires: the Dutch and French
tried to reclaim their Asian empires whereas the British reluctantly but peaceably gave
up theirs. In the British case, the use of the law was to transfer sovereignty and
governance powers to former dependencies; in the case of Ceylon, as it then was, the
law was also used to create a constitutional framework for the exercise of these new
sovereign powers thus foreshadowing a major use of law in the period of
decolonisation over the following two decades but this was not so in the other Asian
dependencies.
Economic and social development via law was typified by British developments.
First, Colonial Development and Welfare Acts (which had started on a very modest
scale in 1929) between 1945 and 1960 made approximately £220m available for
development on the basis of “co-ordinated development programmes for a number of
years”. Development included infrastructure and social services. Two preconditions
for development aid was that “ the country concerned was itself devoting an adequate
part of its resources to investment designed to contribute to the sterling area’s balance
of payments and was ready to make a sufficient contribution towards the particular
scheme in question.”34 Second, 1948 saw the establishment of the Colonial
Development Corporation, a public corporation set up for the purpose of assisting in
the development of dependent countries through the provision of loans or by making
equity investments.35 This development in turn sparked off parallel developments in
dependencies of which the Uganda Development Corporation established as early as
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1952 is probably the best known and provided a model for the development of similar
public development corporations in other Anglophone countries in Africa36. Asian exBritish dependencies too used the model of the British public corporation for their
programmes of state-directed economic and social development.37
But if the use of law to facilitate economic and social development saw a congruence
between the coloniser and the colonised at least in the British empire, constitutional
development to advance political development did not. From the perspective of the
colonised, there was either obduracy on constitutional development which sparked off
armed struggles for independence – Cyprus and Kenya – or at the least internal
violence – Zambia, Malawi, Malaysia – or constitutional ‘developments’ which
seemed designed to give power with one hand but keep it back with the other. This
period was one which from the constitutional perspective was one of the non-stop
production of ever more fanciful constitutions and constitutional arrangements (most
often, federations doomed from the outset), often devised with the aim of preventing a
particular group of people from obtaining the power which their numerical strength
entitled them to in simplistic democratic terms – virtually all African dependencies
where there were European settlers howsoever minuscule the number38, British
Guiana (now Guyana) – at the behest of the USA – and Zanzibar being the best
known examples.
Turning to land issues, this period saw the introduction of policies and laws to match
that were to have a profound and lasting effect on land management from then on.
During the period of the phase 3 empire, it had become progressively more possible in
many dependencies for the indigenous peoples to acquire land under the imposed
(a.k.a. received) law of the colonial power. This had occurred either by specific
agreement or legislation – the mailo lands acquired by Baganda chiefs in Uganda
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being a good example of this39; or by what in effect was custom and practice
stimulated by economic and social pressures on land occupancy sanctioned by judicial
decision – the development of land ownership in some Anglophone West African
countries occurred in this way40 – or by formally acquiring land through the market
as, for instance, took place in Malaysia and other countries in Asia.
In the 1950s however, again focusing on the British empire, as colonialism began to
wind down, the decision was taken to make a deliberate attempt to privatise and
individualise land tenure, principally in African dependencies but also in many of the
Caribbean islands where there was legal individual ownership of land but a lack of
secure tenure owing to the lack of clear boundaries and informal methods of dealing
with land. The best known example of this policy comes from Kenya and its
programme of land adjudication and registration which commenced in the mid 1950s
but it is often forgotten that the policy impetus for this was the report of the East
Africa Royal Commission in 195541 which covered Tanganyika (as it then was) and
Uganda as well as Kenya and had a profound influence on British colonial
development policy generally. It recommended that:
Policy concerning the tenure and disposition of land should aim at the
individualisation of land ownership and mobility in the transfer of land which,
without ignoring existing property rights, will enable access to land for economic
use
Land tenure law cannot simply be left to evolve under the impact of modern
influences. A lead must be given by governments to meet the requirements of the
progressive elements of society by applying a more satisfactory land tenure law.
…exclusive individual ownership of land must be registered…
Individual rights of land ownership should be confirmed by a process of
adjudication and registration…
Undesirable social and economic consequences may arise from the free
negotiability of land titles. Government should have the power to impose
restrictions when it is clearly in the general interests of the country to do so.

The whole chapter on The Tenure and Disposition of Land of which the above are
extracts of the summary of the conclusions of the chapter is couched in this vein. A
clearer statement of the role of governments to use the law to bring about fundamental
economic and social development would be hard to find. Not only did it influence

39

H. West, Land Policy in Buganda, (1972, Cambridge, Cambridge UP).
E.g. Ghana: K. Firman-Sellers, The Transformation of Property Rights in the Gold Coast, (1996,
Cambridge, Cambridge UP).
41
Cmd. 9475, (HMSO, London 1955). The quotations are from pp. 428 – 29.
40

18

British Government policy; it clearly too influenced World Bank policy42 and set in
train policies and legal developments to support them which have lasted to this day.
I would argue then that while from the point of view of the consumers of colonial
L&D, this phase of L&D appeared as if law was being used to prolong the colonial
presence, and prevent the exercise of power by the indigenous population, from the
point of view of the producers, law was being used to lay the foundations of a modern
social democratic but market-orientated state. For the consumers, all that mattered
was acquiring political power – recall Nkrumah’s words: seek ye first the political
kingdom and all else shall be added unto you – and the use of the law first and
foremost was to acquire that power. For the producers who had the political power,
the use of the law was to bring about social and economic change – the classic L&D
position.
The decade of optimism v the decade of nationalism: the 60s.
L&D in the narrow US sense of what we, goodwilled outsiders free from the taint of
colonialism, did and do to and for them, bright-eyed and bushy-tailed independent
states, free at last, or in the case of states in Latin America, equal partners in an
Alliance for Progress with their benign neighbour in the North, got under way in the
1960s:
Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive
But to be young was very heaven43
Even those of us from the old colonial powers set out with high hopes. A major thrust of

the L&D movement in the 60s from the producers’ side – even from those of us who
were not aware that we were part of the movement – was legal education. In
discussing this aspect of the L&D I shall perforce confine myself principally to
countries within the Commonwealth. With the exception of the Indian sub-continent,
where legal education goes back to the mid-nineteenth century, certainly within the
old empire and new Commonwealth, legal education (and lawyers) had been kept at
42
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bay by colonial governments. No law schools were established in any of the new
universities which were created by the British government in the colonies from 1945
onwards and few government scholarships were available for those wishing to study
law abroad during that same period.
This is not to say that there were not indigenous lawyers in newly independent
countries but almost without exception, they had obtained their legal education by
coming to England and studying at the Inns of Court to be barristers, and paying their
own way in doing so. That there had been a long tradition of this may be gauged by
the fact that the legal profession was well established in Ghana (in colonial times, the
Gold Coast) by the 1930s with lawyers playing key roles in nationalist movements
and being appointed to the bench well before independence in 1957, in Nigeria ditto
and to a lesser extent in Malaysia also from the 1940s onwards44. It was the rapidity of
the process of decolonisation in Africa which led the British government to reverse its
position on the necessity (if not desirability) of legal education and the presence of
lawyers in African states which had either become or were about to become
independent and appoint in October 1960 the Committee on Legal Education for
Students from Africa45, known from the time of its appointment as the Denning
Committee on legal education for Africa after its chairman and driving force, Lord
Denning. Without histrionics or any theorising – this was after all a committee
composed entirely of English lawyers – legal education for students from Africa and
the needs for the future were discussed and conclusions arrived at in 29 pages. 10½ of
those pages discussed possible improvements in legal education in the Inns of Court
and 9½ the case for legal education at many different levels up to and including the
establishment of university law schools in Africa. The nearest the Committee came to
any sort of credo was in the following statements:
The great need in most of the territories is to train up Africans to take their proper
part in the administration of justice. One territory after another is gaining
independence or looking forward to it. On the transfer of power the territories will
not only need legislators and administrators. They will also need judges and
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lawyers. And these should, so far as possible, be fairly representative of the
community as a whole…46
When money is short, the question is: What priority should be given to a
faculty of law? Hitherto priority seems to have been given to medicine, arts and
science. We would suggest that, in future, when it is a question of competing
priorities. legal education should rank very high: because upon it the territories
depend for their future judges and magistrates.

Despite or perhaps because of the absence of hyperbole, this report had a very major
impact on the development of the industry of law not only in Anglophone Africa but
in other parts of the Commonwealth as well. If one were to try and compile a list of
the ten most influential inputs into L&D in its formative era, the Denning Report –
dry, factual, totally lacking in imagination or indeed any overt conception of the
socio-legal implications of what it was proposing – could lay claim to be in the top
three. During the 1960s, law schools modelled for the most part on British law
schools were established throughout Anglophone Africa, Malaysia, Singapore and the
Caribbean. By the end of the 1960s, the products of these law schools were beginning
to advance into their legal professions, establish traditions of legal scholarship and
writing and have from that time on been a major influence on the development of law
in their respective countries.
There is no doubt that those who were involved in the early years of legal education
in these countries did think they were making a significant and worthwhile
contribution to the development of law and after a short while to law and
development. The great Wolfgang Friedman developed one of the first overtly L&D
courses on law and economic development in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 196547. The
same law school hosted the seminal African Conference on Local Courts and
Customary Law in 1963, one of the first pan-African meetings of Ministers of Justice,
judges and lawyers which charted the way forward towards the development of
unified legal and judicial systems in African states. Examples of similar
developments could be instanced from other newly founded centres of legal education
46
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throughout the former colonial dependencies. However, as a teachers and scholars, I
think it fair to say that one accepted the state as one found it and set about trying to
educate and train lawyers to work within the state system albeit trying to make it
work better and more in the interests of all and not just the elites as had been the
position in colonial times. The fact of indigenous legal education might have been
novel and in some cases perhaps even threatening48; the exercise in practice was not.
In their public pronouncements however, those who were ‘in at the creation’ made
clear their commitment to and belief in the positive role law could and should play in
the development of new states as the following quotations show:
In its social setting the law must do three things at the same time. In the first
place it must reflect the values of the society it serves – it must be firmly
planted in the soil if it is not to be largely irrelevant to the lives of the people
and thus ignored…
However the law cannot content itself merely with accommodating social
changes after they have occurred. It must take account of the fact of change. A
second function of law in society therefore must be to help in the creation of
conditions, so far as this is possible, in which desirable social developments
can the more readily take place.
…In a period of such fundamental changes and accelerated development
perhaps the law must assume a more positive role in some spheres, must seek
to influence the direction of development even if with only marginal effect. In
this guise the machinery of the law is used to effect socially desirable policy
objectives49.

Burnett Harvey of the University of Michigan Law School played a major role in the
development of legal education and scholarship in Africa during this decade and
indeed into the 1970s. I do not know whether he would have seen himself as a cardcarrying member of L&D movement but both in his work as an educator and as a
scholar, he articulated many of its values:
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Legal research in the almost virgin systems of the emergent nations seemed to
offer the prospect that scholarship could make an immediate, practical
contribution to solving pressing problems and meeting urgent needs. Such
utility, while surely not the hallmark of valid scholarship, should not be
rejected as unworthy of scholarly concern…
…The materials of the law – constitutions, statutes, legislative enactments,
judicial decisions and administrative orders – reflect the struggles of
competing values for expression and realization. It is for this reason that the
study of law can provide significant insights into the structure and processes
of the society as a whole, into the wellsprings of social change which lie
outside the technically defined domains of the law50.

Even in those countries in Latin America which had well established law schools
going back further in time than virtually all law schools in the UK, the 1960s saw
changes take place51. In some countries legal education became more of a full-time
occupation. Exchange programmes with and study in US law schools became much
more common and through these developments, a slow change in the nature of the
legal education enterprise got under way.
The importance of focusing on legal education and scholarship is to make the obvious
but not sufficiently emphasised point that what the 1960s witnessed in many parts of
the developing world was arrival of law and lawyers as a distinct and independent
social force in the countries concerned and even where there was already a legal
profession, its rebirth, if that is not too grand a word, either through the arrival of law
faculties and home-grown lawyers or of more lawyers with some comparative legal
experience and knowledge, as an active player in the development of an independent
polity. This was the major and irreversible L&D input into the developing world. In
the future, whatever the roles which these lawyers assumed, however the external
producers of L&D regarded L&D and their roles in its production, the presence and
work of indigenous lawyers and legal educators where once there were none or very
few or with very lowly status changed for ever the internal role of law in development
and set in train the development of an internal scholarship on L&D.
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Even in the 1960s, and, I would argue, at least as an indirect consequence of the use
of law by the departing colonial powers in the preceding era, the 1960s were a period
when new polities used law as a positive tool of national development. Just as a new
constitution gave birth to a new nation (or so it appeared in many countries rather
than the other way round as had occurred in India and Indonesia for instance) so new
laws were used to give birth to new social and economic trajectories in the new
nations. Three matters may be noted. In Africa, Ghana led the way in reorganising
and creating a plethora of public corporations on the UK and USA/Tennessee Valley
Authority model as its chosen vehicle for economic development52. In Asia, India had
done the same. All over Anglophone Africa, the legal and judicial systems were
reformed to abolish the dual system of courts – one system for Africans, one for nonAfricans – and to provide for a unified system of courts, applicable to all53. In some
countries, a programme of the codification of customary law as a prelude to its
becoming part of the national law of the state commenced54.
Land law received its share of attention. Probably the most far reaching and
revolutionary land law reform was that introduced by Indonesia, the Basic Agrarian
Law of 1960 which abolished the old colonial dual system of land law going back
well into the 19th century, and created a unified modern land law of Indonesia based
on adat law but with the State succeeding to the role of traditional authorities55. As far
reaching as a matter of law reform although not as a matter of revolutionary social
reform was the enactment by Malaysia of the National Land Code in 1965 whose
objectives as described by the Minister in introducing the Bill into Parliament were:
…two
- fold –
(1) it established a uniform clear-cut system of land tenure and dealing, in
place of a confusion of systems, and
(2) it incorporated all those new provisions required to adopt that system to
the social and economic changes of half a century or more.56
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Arguably Tanzania was not far behind Indonesia in fundamental land reform via law.
During the 1960s, it used the law to abolish freehold tenure, provide for land
redistribution from absentee owners to occupiers, and drastically reduce the scope of
landlord/tenant relations in customary tenure57. Kenya went the other way, and
enacted laws to speed up the process of land consolidation, adjudication and
individualisation of tenure on the basis of the recommendations of a Committee of
Inquiry into the existing programme of consolidation and registration while also
introducing increased central control of land dealings and land use58. Malawi and
Zambia too enacted legislation to increase the powers of the state over land, Zambia
going the way of Tanzania in this regard while Malawi moved in Kenya’s direction of
land adjudication.
The two contrasting approaches to land tenure reform and the use of the law to
provide the foundations of it in the 1960s – the one, state control and the
nationalisation or repatriation of land rights, the other state facilitation and regulation
of private ownership of land – heralded the battleground over land reform and the role
of law therein, fighting over which continues to this day. But the apparent contrast
also conceals an underlying commonality of intention: to substitute for a multiplicity
of land laws derived from custom and tradition and owing their legitimacy to the
people, one national land law derived from and owing its legitimacy to the authority
of the state. Uniformity v plurality too has remained a battleground for law reformers
and L&D theorists and in this case, it is a battleground which has a long colonial
history and not just over land law59. So on this matter there was continuity with the
colonial period.
It could be argued that the decade of the 60s saw the external and the internal
approaches to L&D pointing in the same direction. Optimism and nationalism were
then seen as two sides of the same coin. Where external funders came in, they came
in not to impose their own agendas but to assist the new nations realise their own via
law reform. Furthermore, there was a congruence between the external and the
internal approaches that law reform was a key to development.
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The decade of disillusion v the decade of consolidation: the 70s.
The decade of the 70s saw a sharp divergence of both opinion and approach to L&D.
The external producers became disillusioned; the internal consumers assumed the role
of primary producers. There is no need for a predominantly American audience to
rehearse the predominantly American arguments about the death of L&D which
characterised this decade of writing about L&D in American law journals. It is
probably more important to provide an alternative external perspective to this decade.
At the heart of the 70s critique of L&D was liberal legalism. It is still fashionable to
decry the liberal legalism with which L&D missionaries set out on their journeys into
the unknown in the 60s as being naïve and ethnocentric but it is permissible to cast
some slight doubt on so sweeping a generalisation. Three factors may be mentioned.
First, it is easy to forget that for many peoples all over the world, the advent of
independence, a written constitution, popularly elected legislatures, independent
judiciaries, the rule of law and social and economic reforms brought about through
legal mechanisms were a major advance on the previous systems of governance to
which they had been subjected60. At a time when liberal legalism is being subjected to
an unremitting attack from governments in countries that have hitherto prided
themselves as being the home of the ideas, concepts and practices which add up to
liberal legalism, it may perhaps be a little easier to understand the attractions of these
principles, however imperfectly realised in practice, when one does not have them.
Liberal legalism as it was used in the 1960s was not a set of ideas or prescriptions
forced upon unwilling recipients; it was seen for the most part as a necessary
foundation of democratic governance and as a perfectly proper benchmark to use to
criticise the authoritarianism which was becoming manifest in many countries in the
developing world in the late 60s, throughout the 70s and beyond.
Second, the notion of the ‘rule of law’ as an aspect of liberal legalism is one that
comes under increasing attack today on the grounds that it has been hijacked by the
World Bank and other johnny-cum-latelys who have clambered aboard the L&D
bandwagon. I will avert to this later but it is worth highlighting how it was seen and
valued by leading lawyers and others in the developing world in the early L&D
decades. This comment by Telford Georges, the Trinidadian Chief Justice of
Tanzania in the 60s is not untypical:

60

For Africa, see C. Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, (Yale UP, 1994).

26

I do not conceive of the rule of law as meaning nothing more than the
regulation of the affairs of society by a set of rules which are fixed and
certain…This is a purely mechanistic approach…The rules themselves must
be such as are designed to promote what are, I venture to say universally
considered to be worthwhile human values – the freedom of the individual in
its widest sense…and in as far as any society does not strive for the attainment
of these ends for all its citizens, irrespective of race, colour or creed, I would
not agree that it seeks to regulate its affairs in accordance with the rule of
law61.

This attitude to liberal legalism was not unique then nor, it is worth noting, is it now
when it is reference to such ideals as were highlighted by Georges that form the
foundation of appeals for support to pro-democracy movements and the introduction
or re-introduction of the rule of law in countries such as Guatemala, Myanmar and
Zimbabwe.
Third, American disillusionment with L&D as a tool to bring about equitable social
and economic development must be seen as a part of the general turning away from
support for democracy and equity in the developing world by successive US
governments from the mid 1960s onwards as they preferred subservient and
authoritarian client states such as Congo, Indonesia, Brazil, Iran, which supported
them in their Cold War postures to states with at least some semblance of democracy
and independence in thought and action62. Military regimes are not noted for their
interest in doing things in a lawful manner and military regimes became in a very
short space of time in the 60s and thereafter the predominant form of government in
the developing world, albeit some of them tried to transmogrify themselves into
civilian regimes by swapping their uniforms for a lounge suit or civilian robes.
Fourth, the naivety of early protagonists of L&D and of the funders of L&D research
and action was not, in my view, so much their failure to realise that laws which
operate well in one social milieu might not operate either so well or in the same way
in another and very different social milieu (on that issue, even 30 odd years on, there
is still vigorous debate on the effectiveness of legal transplants) as their assumption
that there would be observable and measurable benefits from law reform (of whatever
kind) in a very short space of time. This is a perennial problem with donors and IFIs;
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they have to show ‘results’ and results have to be something that can be weighed and
measured; so many more children in primary schools from funding free primary
education; so many miles of road built or repaired from funding a road building
programme; so many more hectares of land planted with coffee or tea or whatever
from assistance to agricultural development and so on (or so many hectares of drugs
not planted).
But legal development, apart from the number of laws enacted, is not susceptible to
that kind of measurement. It may be that there was too ready an assumption that the
promulgation of a new constitution which heralded a new independent state was both
evidence in itself, and a forecast, of the future close and immediate connection
between law reform and change. It may however take years before any sensible
conclusions can be arrived at on the plusses and minuses of any particular legal input
into social or economic development and considerable acumen to distinguish the
effects of legal as opposed to social, economic, political, scientific etc inputs into and
outputs from a particular trajectory of development. It is no accident that by far the
most detailed and thought-provoking work on the impact of law on economic
development is a survey of 35 years of legal inputs into economic development, and
that was the result of “a collaborative, interdisciplinary, multinational research
effort”63 – all elements which early work on L&D conspicuously lacked. So one
might suggest that the disillusionists gave up too soon.
Fifth, it is, I suppose, a tribute to the writings of the disillusionists in the 70s that it
has been their analysis and critique that have structured the course of L&D in the US
since then. It is therefore worth making the point that, quite apart from the fact that
action, thinking and writing on L&D continued in the South despite the obituaries
being written about it in the US, L&D as a subject of study and research continued in
the North, even in the US where there have been noted scholars that never gave in to
despair. Jim Paul and Bob Seidman spring to mind and it is I think no accident that
they entered the field via work in Africa, principally legal education in Africa, which
as I have already suggested set in train ineradicable changes for the better in new
states in Africa. Bob Seidman in particular continued not merely to write about L&D
but practice it in the field by working in a succession of law schools in Anglophone
Africa.64 On the basis of my own experience I would hazard the guess that like me,
being there, working with lawyers and administrators faced with the daily challenges
of creating and applying law and legal techniques to what must have seemed
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insurmountable economic and social problems, fuelled his commitment to both L&D
as a worthwhile intellectual endeavour but also, and in some ways more important, as
a worthwhile practical exercise working with lawyers and administrators who were
committed, however naively in the view of some, to making a difference through law.
Sixth, it is the case that IFIs, USAID and some other donors did ‘go off’ law as a
relevant developmental input in the 70s. But here too, there has been far too much
stress laid on what the World Bank did or did not do and what USAID did and did not
do. UN agencies did not ‘go off’ law. Concentrating once again on my particular
field, the 70s saw two major UN conferences, the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 and the United Nations Conference on
Human Settlements in Vancouver in 1976. The first conference led to the creation of
UNEP in 1976, the second to UNCHS (Habitat) (now renamed as UN-Habitat) in
1978. UNEP very early on adopted a twin-track policy of bringing nations together to
agree on treaties at the international level to create an international environmental law
and at the national level, of setting in place a programme to assist countries that
wanted the assistance to develop their national environmental laws. UN-Habitat did
not have any similar policies or programmes but responded promptly to requests for
assistance in the matter of creating or revising national urban planning, housing and
building laws. In this respect they were building on the work of the UN Centre for
Housing Building and Planning which had, in very adverse circumstances, been
fielding missions on these matters for some 15 years65. FAO too continued to offer its
services to countries wanting advice and assistance on legal inputs into tenure reform.
The UN’s assistance on the legal front is the appropriate way into the internal
consumer’s perspective on L&D in the 70s. Far from abandoning law as an input to
development, this decade was one of continued commitment to the use of law in
development and a consolidation of much that had been started in the 1960s. Law
schools continued to be founded. The products of the law schools founded in the early
1960s began to make their mark as judges, legislators, legal scholars, legal
practitioners and administrators. Several states in the Commonwealth, following the
British lead as all too often happened, established statutory Law Reform
Commissions with the remit to keep all the law of the country under review and bring
forward proposals for its reform and revision.
There was no let up on the land law front. If the 1960s opened with the revolutionary
Basic Agrarian Law of Indonesia, this decade closed with the equally revolutionary
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Land Law enacted by the People’s Assembly in Mozambique in 1979. No better
explanation of this law is to be found than that by Albie Sachs, then working in
Mozambique:
In many countries that have been independent for decades we do not witness
the transfer of land from the colonialists to the hands of the people. In most
cases reforms occur that tend to adapt colonial law and customary law to the
new situation in which a national bourgeoisie replaces a colonial bourgeoisie.
For us the recovery of the land is integral to the process of the Mozambique
revolution. Because of this it can never signify the mere substitution of names
on property titles nor the return to forms of appropriation and usage peculiar
to feudal tradition…
In essence the principles of the Land Law…synthesized the experience of
generations of poor and dispossessed Mozambicans in their struggle to regain
the land. If the object of land law is normally to legitimate possession by
conquest, the new Mozambican law set out to legitimate repossession by
revolution…
The argument of imposed law versus traditional law must be regarded as a
false one in the light of revolutionary law. The basic themes of the new Land
Law came from the peasantry themselves, at a time of intense struggle against
both foreign domination and indigenous power structures. The Land Law
emphasises that the people do not simply inherit law, or submit to law
imposed on them from the outside. They create law, and become themselves
the instruments for the implementation of the new norms which they have

evolved…
Lawyers need by no means be silent amid the roar of revolution. On the
contrary, they have an important role to fulfil, not as opponents of change but
as activists for progress, helping to clarify and apply the new norms in a way
which facilitates the desired transformations, that eliminates arbitrariness and
that defines in clear and understandable terms the rights and duties of
citizens…66

We may regard these comments as slightly ott and certainly the Land Law did not live
up to Sachs’s panegyric – if for no other reason, the South African backed Renamo
insurgency saw to that – but Sachs’s own commitment lives on as, to take just the
land and housing areas, the Grootboom67 and Richtersveld68 decisions in the South
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African Constitutional Court show. And with all due respect to Bob Seidman’s work
on legal drafting, does not the statement of the lawyer’s role in revolutionary times
perfectly sum up what the good draftsperson should aim for at all times? Here then is
another lawyer who, by continuing to work at the sharp end of L&D, has kept the
faith.
Mozambique was not the only country to use law to essay fundamental land reform.
Notwithstanding the horrors of Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda in the 70s, some
interesting laws and policies were introduced during that period69. None more so than
the Land Reform Decree, 1975 which attempted to deal with the perennial problem of
mailo land – freehold land granted to Baganda chiefs without regard to the preexisting customary tenurial relationship between the chiefs and the occupants of the
land by the Buganda Agreement in 1900 between the British and Buganda
governments which set in train constant (and continuing to this day) conflict between
tenants and landlords over rights to occupy and use the land70 – by abolishing the
tenure and converting all land in Uganda into public land held from the State on, at
most, 99 year leases.
There are not wanting those in Uganda (not, it has to be said, many Baganda) who
argue that the Land Reform Decree was the best effort ever made to grapple with the
colonial legacy of fraught land relations since it represented a root and branch attempt
to get rid of the poisoned chalice of private landlord/tenant relations in Buganda and
in the ‘Lost Counties’71 and impose a uniform system of land administration
throughout the country. It was not to be: a combination of four more years of Amin, a
period of Presidential instability for 18 months then the regime known as Obote II,
generally reckoned to be at least as bloodthirsty as Amin’s, until it was overthrown in
1986, destroyed any possibility of the new law being applied.
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In West Africa, Nigeria too went down the route of public ownership of land by the
Land Use Decree of 1978 promulgated by the military regime of General Obasanyo72.
Until that time, Nigeria had had two systems of land tenure operative in the country;
in the South a dual system of ‘modern’ Western land tenure and customary tenure
with land being able to move between the two systems; in the North, a paternalist
system with all land under the control of the government with the government
empowered to make grants of rights of occupancy to individuals and regulate the
manner and form of their dealing with those rights. After a series of reports of
committees in the early to mid 70s on the problems of the land tenure system, the
then military government opted for a new national system based on that operative in
the north of the country. The new policies were described thus:
The policy adopted was one of trusteeship which embraced many of the
essential principles of the Northern Nigeria Land Tenure Law [of 1962 which
was a modernised version of the colonial Land and Native Rights Ordinance
of 1916].
Trusteeship policy, however, differs from the paternalistic one in its
essential objects. Whilst paternalism aimed at securing for members of ethnic
groups the use and occupation of land, and permitted discriminatory conduct
against members of other ethnic groups, “trusteeship” aims at securing the
implementation of fundamental objectives of national policies and proscribes
discrimination in land matters. The methods of achieving these objectives
were by vesting all land comprised in the state, other than federal lands, in the
military government of the state in trust to be administered for the use and
common benefit of all Nigerians and by establishing uniform national
principles.73 (italics in the original).

The Decree was promulgated by a military government. It has survived two new
constitutions, two civilian governments and four military regimes. At the same time
as it is held up as an example of a national land law, it is widely circumvented in
practice. In the North, traditional rulers still exercise considerable authority over land
allocation, albeit in an ‘informal’ de facto mode. In the South, a land market, with or
without official sanction still operates. State governors have enormous powers over
land; many of them are unable to resist the temptation to encash those powers.
A final example comes from Southern Africa: Lesotho. After the application of strong
donor pressure led by the World Bank, Lesotho finally enacted the Land Act 1979.
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Land in Lesotho had always been vested in the King in trust for the Basotho Nation
and the Land Act did not alter that fundamental position. The law was designed to
remove allocation and management powers over customary tenure from the chiefs as
delegates of the King and vest them in elected bodies as delegates of an elected
government (sort of74) on the basis of nationally set principles and standards. It
created a new system of leasehold tenure which ostensibly anyone could move into
from customary tenure but since that form of tenure was unknown to the Basotho,
was widely seen as a means to facilitate foreign – a.k.a. South African – acquisition
of urban land and the best agricultural land for commercial agriculture. The Act was
dead in the water from the time it was enacted; the King opposed it and used his not
inconsiderable informal powers to subvert it.75
It was not only in Africa that land law was reformed. Radical land law reform took
place in India with the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 which sought
to impose a ceiling on holdings of urban land and to empower the government to
acquire urban land held in excess of the ceiling. The aim in the analysis of a
sympathetic commentator was to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands
of a few people and to bring about the equitable distribution of land in urban areas for
the common good. The reality in the words of the same commentator was as follows:
The hastily enacted legislation bristles with anomalies, seeks to impose
irksome restrictions on the ownership and transfer of property, fixes an
unimaginative arbitrary ceiling, all clothed, in intricate official jargon and
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confusing and contradictory provisions that have provoked wide controversy.
Lawyers and jurists who have sought to interpret the key sections find
themselves as much at sea as the lay citizens, the official clarifications offer
little help and less solace. The elaborate complicated form that has to be filled
in by the helpless urban property owners is the last straw on his back.76

Several common themes come through very clearly both in these examples and in the
ones referred to in the previous section of this paper. The first is that just as with the
establishment of empire, the government of a new nation focused on the importance
of reorganising the management of and rights in land. Sovereignty over land
conferred power to determine rights to land. The second theme follows from the first:
the essential need for a national solution to the land question; that any national
solution must start from the principle that the state or the nation must have a major or
the primary role in determining what land is to be used for and what rights in the land
and for how long should the individual be permitted. It followed then that the radical
title to land should be vested in the state and held by the state on behalf of the people;
a top down centralised bureaucratic response to the perceived problem. This too was
very much a continuation of the imperial imperative.
The third theme is that this transformation could only be achieved by using the law to
bring it about and that even where governments themselves had a distinctly shaky
relationship to legitimacy based on law, they opted to use law to provide the ‘proper’
basis for this transformation. Law was seen then as the essential mechanism to bring
about fundamental social and economic change via changes in land relations. From
the perspective being adopted here, it is of less importance that in virtually all the
cases discussed here, the end result of vesting land and powers of allocation of,
regulation of transactions in and use of, land in governments did not lead either to
rapid economic development or social equity in land holdership than that these steps
were taken by governments in the South using law and legal techniques, usually using
national lawyers increasingly trained in the states concerned or in other states in the
South, and this at a time when the world was being informed that L&D was dead.
The fourth theme follows on from this. Attempts to bring about fundamental change
by law were undertaken by governments and commented on often critically by legal
and other scholars in the countries concerned. A critical national L&D literature was
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being developed alongside attempts to utilise law in the service of development in the
South. This too was largely ignored then and has continued to be largely ignored.77
I first became involved in L&D as a practitioner/consultant (as opposed as a teacher)
in this decade when I acted as a UN consultant advising on and drafting urban
planning laws in Tanzania and Nigeria and housing and environmental laws in
Tanzania. I worked in urban development corporations, the Capital Development
Authority in Tanzania developing legal frameworks for the planning and building of
the new capital of Dodoma and the Kano Urban Development Corporation in Nigeria
revising that state’s town and country planning laws. I wrote up my experiences a few
years later and will summarise them here78. The first point worth making is that the
planning laws I was asked to review or work with in both countries were the British
colonial models enacted in Tanzania in 1957 and in Nigeria 1946 which in essence
had been left untouched since the independence of both countries in, respectively,
1961 and 1960. The reason for this was broadly the same as the reason for the topdown approach to land tenure reform: the laws accorded perfectly well with the views
and attitudes of the ruling elite, both civil and military, which in this respect was not
too different from those of colonial power. There was a very clear appreciation, on
the part of the authorities, that urban planning was about power over land and that this
was too important to be handed over to bodies over whom governments might not
have complete control; i.e. local authorities or to involve the people via any sort of
participation. Tenure reform in both countries, as we have seen, replicated the
colonial model.
A more fundamental issue that I attempted to address was what might be called the
legal liberalism question: does law on the Western legal liberalism model have any
constructive role to play in urban development? The arguments against can be put at
two levels. The cynical level was put to me by a planning consultant in Dodoma,
Tanzania. ‘Why bother? he said, ‘Does it really matter whether the agency [in the
instant case the Capital Development Authority] obeys the law or not? Wouldn't
everything go on as “normal” if they didn’t bother?’ It would be hypocritical to
pretend that this sort of attitude is unique; it is widespread among officials and
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consultants not least because it is grounded in reality. Certainly, when I arrived, the
CDA was pretty careless about the law.
Similarly in Kano, a master plan was published in 1966 and successive urban
development authorities had attempted to implement it, yet none of the formal legal
steps necessary to publicise the plan, consider objections to it, and approve it, thus
giving it a legal status, and legal backing to enforcement action, had been taken. No
legal challenge has been mounted to any enforcement action. As it was put to me by
the Chairman of the Kano Urban Development Board (KUDB), authority and power
rather than law was what counted in Kano.
The other level of argument is in a sense an alternative development argument. This
argument says in general terms that the law impedes the efforts of ordinary people to
house themselves, to obtain an income, to get access to potable water, electricity and
other urban services and thereby to survive and better themselves in an urban
environment. Law turns homesteaders into squatters, self-build houses into ‘slums’
and ‘nuisances’ which must be demolished; petty traders into criminals and job
seekers into vagrants. The less the law and lawyers have to do with uncontrolled
urban settlement and the informal urban economy, the more chance persons in those
sectors have of survival and development. again my experience both then and later
supports that argument.
What answers then can be made to these legitimate and powerful criticisms of the role
of law in urban development? there are three answers. First, A general answer is that
government in accordance with the law is likely to be fairer, more respected, more
effective in the long run than government in defiance or in disregard for the law; both
at the humble level of urban planning and at more elevated levels of governance in
general by e.g. military rulers across the globe one can point to evidence of that.
Within government then, law can provide a measure of certainty and support for
particular policies and programmes, and institutions whose job it is to execute them.
Second is the question of government v the people An example would be a law that
confers powers on government, and rights on the people, such as a law permitting
compulsory acquisition of land subject to the payment of compensation.
Governments are more likely to know their powers than people their rights, and this
will result in an unequal application of the law. That may be so but the solution to this
is not to decry a legal input into urban or any other sort of development, but to argue
for and propose a law which moves the machinery of government just a few steps
away from its existing authoritarian stance. The contrast between the official
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treatment of squatters in Karachi and in virtually any Indian city, reinforces that
point: India is a country which, whatever its imperfections, is ruled by law and in
which courts can be, and are effective in halting government action against squatters;
the famous case of Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Council in 1986 well illustrates
that. Pakistan has been for too long ruled by military force and the courts have no
effective role in the control of such force. Again, in Africa, contrast the role of law in
protecting squatters as demonstrated in Grootbloom and the lack of any legal restraint
on the military regime in Nigeria when it implemented a major and crude slum
clearance programme in Lagos. Law then can be a handle to be used in the struggle
for a more humane or reasonable government, and for more humane and reasonable
administration of programmes of urban development.
A third reason concerns the repatriation of decision-making. There is a great deal
written about the deleterious effect that international – usually western orientated –
consultants, planners and administrators can have on national priorities in respect of
urban development.79 The decision to use foreign planning consultants to produce a
master plan for an urban area has the inevitable effect of passing decision-making not
just on the making of the plan but on its detailed implementation over to those
consultants, ignoring or bypassing the national statutory procedures for plan making,
approval and implementation. In Dodoma, for instance in the early years of the
capital development programme, the master planners did most of their work in
Toronto, their headquarters, and provided both in the plan and in their consultancy
contract that no changes could take place in the plan without their being involved.
The effect of this was that when some of their more far-fetched ideas were seen to be
impractical by planners on the spot, a memorandum suggesting changes would be
compiled and sent to Toronto; a pause would ensue until the reply came back
defending the sanctity of the plan down to the last eight-lane highway. The reply
would be addressed to the Director-General of CDA bypassing all normal procedures,
and hinting that criticisms of the plan were motivated by malice and ignorance. The
reply was accepted, and the plan left untouched – and unimplemented. Re-asserting
the need for law and providing an appropriate legal framework for decision-making
can go some way towards national and legal decision-making. Yes, the decisions may
be skewed in favour of one ethnic group or the decision-makers and their relatives or
the wealthy elite, but so was decision-making abroad – in favour of the overseas
consultants and their families.
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I have dwelt at some length on these two cases since in retrospect they shaped my
work in the field from then on. Faced with the lack of law or a lack of respect for the
law, the aim was to find allies to assert the liberal values of the law and to try and
shape any new laws to move the bureaucracy, still heavily influenced by colonial
attitudes that the people’s role was to obey bureaucratic orders not challenge them
and assert legal rights, to understand and accept that their job would be made easier if
it was seen as a partnership with the people, a partnership in which all parties would
gain from complying with a fair law. So as with my (and I have argued, legal
educators generally) role in legal education in the 60s, so in this decade; I was,
broadly, accepting the existing state structures and configurations of power which, as
North’s explanation of path dependency80 has showed us, we should have anticipated
were a continuation of colonial configurations and was concerned only to try and
make small incremental changes at the margins.
The decade of neglect but transition v the limits of legal radicalism81: the 80s.
There can be little doubt that the 80s were the low point for L&D in general. From the
external producers’ perspective, with the exception of UN agencies, assistance to law
reform in the South was a no-go area for IFIs and donors from the North. Those
American academics who had written the obituary of L&D in the 70s, moved on to
other more intellectually and financially rewarding fields.
Neglect refers to the general North American perspective on L&D during this decade,
embracing the IFIs domiciled in the US and the US intellectual input into L&D work.
From the wider foreign policy perspective, the 80s was the decade when maximum
attention was paid to prosecuting the Cold War so that decisions about inputs into the
South were viewed very much from that perspective. There is no need to go into
details since I assume that these are well known to this audience but overall US
support was provided not for law and development but for war and the destruction of
development.82 Indifference to or neglect of L&D indeed might be too polite a word
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to use to characterise these policies: in turning a blind eye to or in some case fuelling
corruption, lawlessness and abuse of power by dictators, these policies mightily
contributed to the defects of governance which two decades on, ‘new law and
development’ (NLD) is in the forefront of trying to ‘correct’.
From a developmentalist perspective, the 80s were the decade when:
The role of the state in development came under heavy fire as the new
liberalism in economic and political affairs gained ascendancy in western
capitals and hence in the international institutions. It was time to roll back the
state and let the free play of market forces generate the energies which would
get development moving again.83

The corollary of such a perspective was that since the law had been used to confer
powers on the state in the preceding two developmental decades, the last thing that
was needed now was more law: what was needed was less law; less regulation
strangling free markets; less controls over land use and land transactions; less
legalised opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour. The structural adjustment
programmes that dominated IFI ‘assistance’ to countries in the South in the 80s did
not at that time feature any concern about good governance or legal and judicial
system reform; one certainly did not need any L&D assistance to dismantle inefficient
legal superstructures.
Yet it would be a misperception to think of the 80s as a decade when there was no
external interest in law as an input into development even if it was not an overtly or
explicitly L&D input. On the intellectual front, while there was a falling away of
mainstream US legal journals carrying articles on L&D, two journals based in the US
revamped themselves to adopt a more explicitly L&D focus. Third World Legal
Studies was founded in 1982 as the annual publication of the Third World Legal
Studies Association (INTWORLSA) a body that had reconstituted itself from the
African Law Association in America ( AALA). The annual publication was explicitly
designed to
respond to the needs of growing numbers of lawyers, particularly those in the
third world (italics added) who are becoming more engaged, -- not only as
teachers and scholars but as activists – in “law and development” work which
seeks social justice for people who are poor and oppressed…We hope that

services have immeasurably set back the development in Southern Africa.” World Bank, Sub-Saharan
Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,(Washington, D.C. 1989) p. 23, Box 1.1
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Third World Legal Studies can help to provide a kind of legal literature which
is needed in both intellectual and operational settings.84

The second such journal makeover was the Journal of Legal Pluralism that too had
transmogrified itself from an Africa only journal – African Law Studies. This journal
too had a more European flavour to it85 and it is these two factors – the greater impact
that legal scholars from the South and based sometimes in the South – often not as
worsening economic circumstances or political persecution or worse had driven them
out – and mainland European legal scholars began to have on L&D writing that
requires one to acknowledge this as a decade of transition as well as of neglect.
Another important transitional factor was that the 80s saw more input into L&D of
disciplines other than law and lawyers. On the intellectual front, the space vacated by
legal academics particularly in the US began to be filled by legal anthropologists.
Legal anthropology had been a discipline investigating customary and traditional law
in the field and attempting to make an impact on the practice of law in colonies in
Africa and the South Pacific long before lawyers discovered the field.86 Goodhart’s
view that the jurist’s “ cavalier treatment of early law” can be ascribed to that law’s
inability to fit into the Austinian definition of law as command and the lack of
evidence as understood by jurists about early law, i.e. case records87, may have some
truth in it but whatever the reason, the early pioneers of L&D did not regard legal
anthropologists as being part of the movement88 – a position entirely consistent with
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the modernisation perspective adopted by L&D. But the work of scholars such as
Moore89, Roberts90 and Charnock91, to name only those writing about law in Africa in
the 70s and 80s made it increasingly difficult for L&D a branch of legal scholarship
committed to multi-disciplinarity to ignore the contribution of legal anthropology to
L&D and legal anthropologists themselves began to see their contribution as being at
the least quasi-L&D.92 Their contribution enriched and continues to enrich L&D.
On the practical front too, IFIs and, for the most part, donors saw little need to
become involved in law reform in the South. One exception was USAID which began
its commitment to justice reform in Latin America in the 1980s. Although focusing
on human rights and criminal justice, “over the years, USAID has adopted a codedriven reform model, organised around the drafting and implementation of new
criminal procedure codes.” Other activities were included “but the new laws created a
special impetus and real deadlines: once the laws went into effect, things had to
change.” 93. That somewhat optimistic comment is rather at odds with the later
comment that
“in the early 1980s, when USAID introduced the initiative in Central America,
local interest and demand were limited; the agency itself had little idea of what it
intended to do…judicial reform lacked a significant constituency within USAID. It
continued to be seen by those making resource allocations as a less worthy
competitor for scarce funding…The idea that working with courts and legal
frameworks would advance development goals was not readily accepted.94

In a sense then, this was an exception that proved the rule: a small programme facing
both financial and agency-ideological opposition adopting the same old approach
which had been castigated by the disillusionists in the previous decade.
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UN agencies did not have such a jaundiced view of the role of law as other donors
and IFIs and by the end of the decade this alternative view was beginning to have an
impact on IFIs and donors. I will quote my own experience here with the usual
caveats about drawing too general conclusions from a wilderness of single instances.
During the 1980s, I was involved in several exercises in law reform and law review in
Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, mainly working for UN-Habitat in the field of urban
planning law. The variety of missions that I undertook give some indication of the
role that law at least in this area was thought able to play.
The missions I undertook were of three broad types. The first was in response to
requests for legal inputs into urban and national planning as part of general
programmes to develop and implement city or national or physical development plans
– Zanzibar in 1982, Madras (now Chennai) in 1983, (a British Government funded
project), Maldives in 1983, Malawi in 1984, Trinidad and Tobago in 1986 – 88 – or
part of an exercise to rewrite law and administration in connection with spatial
planning in the light of a political transformation set in train by a successful guerrilla
war leading to independence – Zimbabwe in 1981. The second type was a more
narrowly focused on the perceived need for some legal input to provide the necessary
powers to control developmental pressures – Turks and Caicos Island, in 1984,
British Virgin Islands in 1989 – British colonies but oddly the missions were UNHabitat ones, or to spur development as in Uganda in 1980. The third type was to
review and comment on existing laws, either a specific law – town and country
planning in Calcutta in 1983 – or a whole corpus of law as with a Swedeforest (an
offshoot of SIDA) mission to review the law on land use and environmental
management in Lesotho in 1989. In all countries there was existing town and country
planning law, based for the most part on the Colonial Office model of the late
40s/early 50s (which in turn was an amalgam of the English 1932 and 1947 town and
country planning Acts), except in Zimbabwe which had introduced a model based in
words on the reformed English town and country planning law of 1968 while in
practice still adhering to the rigid racial zoning of the 40s law.
The countries and governments involved covered the whole spectrum of governments
in the South: colonies; full democracies in India and Trinidad and Tobago; fledgling
democracies as in Zimbabwe; authoritarian regimes of various hues: Malawi and
Zanzibar both ruthless with political opponents, Maldives less so; military rule as in
Lesotho and a country just emerging from military rule as in Uganda. Yet while all
were apparently united in their belief that a legal input into development was
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necessary, and that this legal input was to be a top-down governmental input, there
were different emphases on the appropriate legal input.
Indian planners in Madras were aware of the limits of law; they could not
contemplate a situation where they would need a battalion of troops to enforce the
law. Trinidadian planners were concerned that my draft law might not have sufficient
enforcement powers in it and did not specifically state that one of the principal
purposes of town and country planning was to ensure the “orderly” development of
the island; they looked with envy at Barbados where people seemed more willing to
obey the planning laws.95 In Uganda too, the criticism of my law on the creation of an
urban development corporation was that there were too few criminal penalties in the
law making it difficult to enforce. In Maldives, the Attorney-General was concerned
that my law was too detailed; less law, more power was his preferred approach. In
Zimbabwe, the chief planner at first rejected my report on possible reforms to the
planning laws of that country on the grounds that I was biased and that the planning
law were entirely ‘objective’ and a-political, a view shared by the President of the
Administrative Court.96 In Malawi, there was a fairly non-committal acceptance of
my draft law which did introduce some participation and due process into the
planning system which was run in an efficient and ‘colonial’ manner.97
The three missions to Calcutta, Turks and Caicos and British Virgin Islands were
particularly instructive. In Calcutta, the mission was to advise the Urban
95
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Development Authority on the ‘proper’ meaning of the phrase “other material
considerations” in the new town and country planning law. The phrase had been taken
from the English planning law and the assumption behind our visit – I was with a
very senior ex-planner and ex-chief executive from English local government – was
that the meaning of the term in English planning law should be transplanted in
Calcutta. We explained as delicately as we could – we had after all been brought a
long way and treated very well – that the English meaning of the term was irrelevant
to the circumstances of Calcutta which had to develop its own meaning. “Ah,
Professor,” I was told by a very senior IAS official “ in India, we have your followed
your planning law mistake by mistake.” Has there ever been a more succinct
summary of the problems of L&D?
In the Turks and Caicos Islands, I tried to draft an original law for a small island
administration. The Attorney-General, a British official who had previously been the
senior legal officer in a London local authority98 was concerned that the law should
not be too different from English planning law. His reason was that he was under
constant pressure from lawyers from the US representing clients who wanted to build
in the islands and were adept at finding loopholes in every law designed to control
such building. He would be in a much stronger position if he could quote English
judicial precedents on the meaning of the local planning law if the words in that local
law were to be exactly the same as those in the English planning law. It was an
argument that was difficult to counter.99
The British Virgin Islands are small in size and population but they presented a major
challenge to any person attempting to introduce changes to the land laws.100 “Without
land, a person is not a man” it was put to me and given the history of slavery in the
Caribbean, such a sentiment is easy to understand. Having land meant having the
right to do with the land what one wanted; planning laws attempted to interfere with
that right. Thus while the principle of having a law to regulate and control the (largely
American) pressures for development was accepted, the implications of it – that some
people might not be able to use their land as they saw fit – were more difficult to
accept and sell to the population. In particular, Maurer notes that there has been
constant criticism of ‘foreign laws’ and ‘exotic plants’(outside experts and outside
98
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legal draftsmen) which is, perhaps oddly, directed not so much at the content of the
laws as of their origin:
In authoring their “own” laws, British Virgin Islanders demonstrate to
themselves their ability to be “authors”, to write from a coherent, unified and
unique subject position, to authorize a “nation” – to be subjects of (legislative,
national) history.101

Working with governments at this time exposed me to the full gamut of official
attitudes to regulatory law and its role in development. The common thread was that
of realism; a law must be useable but also advance the policies of government. There
was a belief in the efficacy of official law and a general reluctance to accept any
claim of legitimacy or right of those who were not complying with the official law –
squatters, unauthorised developers etc. In Trinidad and Tobago, this went so far as to
regard those planners who had left the Town Planning Department and set up as
private planners and then espoused the cause of informal settlements via the Sou Sou
movement as being ‘traitors’.102 There was, I would also claim with the advantage of
hindsight, an implicit acceptance of the modernisation approach to development;
development meant demolishing old out-of-date buildings and rebuilding the cities
with shopping malls, high-rise buildings, multi-lane paved highways; planning law
was a key tool to achieve that.103 The officials I worked with had nearly all spent time
in the North or the developed South104 and that was their point of reference. We were
on the same wavelength and it was a completely different one to the majority of the
people in the country concerned. The realism required of the law was then an unreal
realism: the laws to be applied were alien to the culture of those to whom they were
to be applied.
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From an internal perspective, the title of Shivji’s book sums up the decade not just for
Africa but, I would argue, more generally. The radical agenda of the South had
attempted to carve a new way forward for development – political independence was
to be matched by economic independence, colonial social conservatism replaced by
fundamental and radical social change. The law was to be the medium through which
these transformations were to be brought about. As was recounted in the survey of the
two periods of the 60s and the 70s, the law was used very vigorously to set in place
not merely new autocthonous constitutions and political systems but new economic
and social policies and programmes. With respect to land we have seen that the
predominant thrust of land law reforms was in the direction of increased government
ownership and control of land tenure and land use.
By the end of the 1980s, at least so far as most states in Africa and some states in
Asia and the Caribbean were concerned, these policies had not been successful. In
some cases they had been disastrous. The influential and widely accepted (including
by many African commentators) World Bank Report: Sub-Saharan Africa: From
Crisis to Sustainable Growth published in 1989 summed up the position in Africa:
Africa’s generally poor performance during the past 10 years has been
reflected in weak growth in the productive sectors, poor export performance,
mounting debt, deteriorating social conditions, environmental degradation and
the increasing decay of institutional capacity…
In many African countries, the administrations, judiciaries and educational
institutions are now mere shadows of their former selves. This widespread
institutional decay in symbolised by the poor physical condition of once
world-class institutions such as the University of Legon in Ghana and
Makerere University in Uganda, [and] by the breakdown of judicial systems in
a number of countries…
Equally worrying is the widespread impression of political decline.
Corruption, oppression and nepotism are increasingly evident. These are
hardly unique to Africa but they may have been exacerbated by development
strategies that concentrated power and resources in government bureaucracies
without countervailing measures to ensure public accountability or political
consensus. On the one hand, in several countries the neglect of due process
has robbed institutions of their legitimacy and credibility. On the other hand,
the proliferation of administrative regulations like licensing, controls, and
quotas has encouraged corruption and set the individual against the system.
Sometimes the military have deposed unpopular regimes. But often this has
led to more, not less, state violence and lawlessness…
…A combination of administrative bottlenecks, unauthorised “fees” and
“commissions”…imposed costs on businesses that have progressively
undermined their international competitiveness. The gradual breakdown of
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judicial systems in many countries left foreign investors doubtful that
contracts could be enforced…Authoritarian governments hostile to grassroots
and nongovernmental organisations have alienated much of the public. As a
result economic activity has shifted increasingly to the informal sector. Too
frequently ordinary people see government as the source not the solution to
their problems. 105

This analysis of institutional decline and decay could apply equally to some Asian
states which in economic terms were far outperforming virtually all states in Africa.
Consider this analysis of Indonesian institutional decay in the late 80s by an
Indonesian scholar:
Despite the resumption of rapid growth in the late 1980s, several
commentators, including academic economists, began to voice concern about
threats not only to long-term growth but also to the cherished national goal of
establishing a ‘just and prosperous society (masyarakat adil dan makmur).
These issues were interrelated and included the burgeoning corruption at all
levels of the government bureaucracy, collusive relationships between
political powerholders and their business cronies and the proliferation of
policy
- generated barriers to domestic competition. The ‘KKN’ (korupsi,
kolusi, nepotisme) practices as they later became known, distorted market
incentives by rewarding ‘rent-seeking’ rather than productive entrepreneurial
activities.106

Legal radicalism although for the most part home-grown (though just as there were
external proponents of legal liberalism on hand to educate, advise and assist, so too
were there external proponents of legal radicalism on hand to do the same) had
apparently led to the same dead-end as had legal liberalism though not for exactly the
same reasons: with legal liberalism, there was a too ready assumption that the checks
and balances of a liberal constitutional order could be transposed to a developmental
state in a hurry to overcome ‘poverty, ignorance and disease’; with legal radicalism,
an over-enthusiastic espousal of law as a tool of change had invested too great an
array of powers in government with not enough attention paid to devising appropriate
checks and balances; the legal baby was thrown out with the liberal bathwater.
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This issue needs to be elaborated in more depth. My argument is that starting in the
1970s but picking up and becoming the norm in the 1980s, the form and content of
the legal procedures whereby powers were to be exercised changed in many
countries; unfettered discretion was enhanced; limits on discretion were fewer and in
practice, the law was widely disregarded on a day-to-day basis. Legal radicalism
appeared to see nothing wrong with this. No better witness to this can be put forward
than Yash Ghai, without any question the doyen of lawyers working at the coal-face
of, and writing about, L&D in the world today:
Legal radicals in Dar es Salaam were not revolutionised by their experiences
of the law. Nor did they attempt to use the law for progressive causes. In fact
few of them had practised law; or worked in the administration…indeed there
was no serious concern with law. The law was seen as a battleground and its
potential for supporting progressive initiatives denied…and the sooner it was
abolished the better.
I had difficulties with this analysis on theoretical as well as practical
grounds…The practical difficulty was that while the radical lawyers were
denouncing law as a tool of oppression, and asking for its abolition, the reality
seemed to be that the government was frequently disregarding the law…The
government cared neither for the ideology nor the practice of legality. The
President was ordering hundreds of undergraduates to be sent down and
hundreds of farmers to be detained without any lawful authority; and his
example in the violation of the law was followed by numerous others at all
levels of government and party…
My experience seemed to point to the problems when the fidelity to the law
weakens – the arrogance of power, the corruption of public life, the insecurity
of the disadvantaged.107

It was this disregard of the law which fed into the type of legislation that concentrated
on conferring powers on Ministers and the bureaucracy and ignored process. The
exercise started at the top with the dismantling of constitutional safeguards and the
conversion of constitutions into tools for the aggrandisement of power.108 This
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approach to legislation was accentuated when military regimes were in power when
constitutions were dispensed with or at best were made subject to a superior military
ordering.109 There were two reasons for this. First the military were, generally,
uninterested in legal niceties and it would have been a brave government lawyer who
pointed out that it was not in accordance with legal proprieties for a particular law to
be couched in language that seemed to provide no limits to the exercise of powers.
Second, there were usually no mechanisms for draft laws to be scrutinised before they
were promulgated.110 A further contributory factor to using statute law as legalised
power grabbing, common to civilian and military regimes alike, was that there was a
general reluctance to use the courts to challenge exercises of governmental powers;
an equal reluctance on the part of the courts to entertain any such challenges that were
mounted; and a further reluctance on the part of governments to pay much attention to
any decisions that went against them.
As good an example of this trend towards replacing laws which relied on persuasion
by ones which relied on compulsion as can be found comes from Tanzania.111
Starting in the mid 70s but continuing into the 80s until the retirement of President
Nyerere, coercion was used to force peasants into the villagisation programme in
“Operation Sogeza” (Operation Push) without any legal backing for such actions. In
addition, peasants were required by law to grow certain crops and those who failed to
comply were punished by imprisonment. Many prosecutions and convictions were
recorded throughout the country. There were many examples too of party officials
exercising powers quite outside the law with peasants having no redress. Not until the
1990s was it politically possible to bring actions in the courts to try and right the
wrongs of the 70s and 80s.112
Similar laws were enacted to deal with urban “loiterers”. Let Tripp tell the tale of
Human Resources Deployment Act, 1983:
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Under this Act, also known as Nguvu Kazi, those who could not produce
identification were to be resettled in the countryside. In the Dar es Salaam
region all unlicensed, self-employed people, including fish-sellers, shoe
repairmen and tailors were considered idle and disorderly and treated like
loiterers…Even an employed person found walking the streets during working
hours could be charged with “engaged in a frolic of his own at a time he is
supposed to be engaged in activities connected to or relating to the business of
his employment”…
But it quickly became clear that the campaign was a failure. No sooner
were truckloads of people dropped off in rural areas than most of them
returned to the city to resume their small scale enterprises. The illegal trade in
identification papers boomed so that virtually anyone could come up with
some form of documentation…113

In Tanzania there was a veneer of legalism to the use of coercion. This was not
always the case in other countries. Indonesia provided an example of force being used
without regard to the law. The notorious transmigration programme involved seizure
of land, displacement or forcible assimilation of local people and the setting aside of
community land rights in the name of development. No or inadequate compensation
was paid when land was appropriated, the official line being that traditional owners
had voluntarily contributed their land to the transmigration project. In the case of
some projects, the new settlers obtained no rights to land and in the Perkebunan Inti
Rakyat (PIR) schemes, existing land owners had found themselves in the position that
they had to pay for land they already owned and would only be able to obtain a title
under the Basic Agrarian Law if they had shown themselves to be “satisfactory
labourers” an unknown and undocumented criteria.114
What the Tanzanian examples show is the clash between the official law and reality –
the reality of the daily lives of the peasants and of the workers in the informal urban
economy. Within that economy, as much research has demonstrated, there is a legal
system, often aping, as it were, the formal legal system. Contracts are made and
enforced; property and land is bought and sold but the official system takes no
account of these transactions or activities. When people who claimed to have rights to
e.g. land under the unofficial system attempted to exert those rights in the official
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system, they were turned away as squatters115; only the Indian Supreme Court in this
period seemed willing to recognise that the poor had rights which should be
recognised.
Precisely because the informal legal system was unofficial and ‘illegal’, there was
little attempt by lawyers or legal reformers to consider whether lessons could be
learned from such systems which could be applied to the formal system; that is,
whether the poor were using an informal system out of necessity rather than choice,
not deliberately wishing to act in an illegal manner. The attitude of the Tanzanian
President who compared ‘loiterers’ with economic saboteurs and racketeers “whom
the nation has just declared war on”116 was a not uncommon one in the governments
of the South. Nor was there any interest at this time in the developing legal system
reform programmes to grapple with the informal legal systems.
It was not until the very end of this decade that a new perspective was provided. De
Soto published The Other Path in 1989.117 This study of the informal urban economy
of Peru was not the first such study to have been undertaken but it spelt out in some
detail the costs and benefits of using informal and formal legal systems and the need
to tackle the problem of inappropriate formal legal systems which drove people into
the informal system. In a way which law reform commissions did not, it quantified
the costs of the over-bureaucratised formal economy and the costs to the national
economy of not having a good law which protected contracts and property rights of
the poor. Whatever its academic shortcomings, The Other Path proved enormously
influential in directing attention to the importance of law in development and the need
to “adapt the law to reality [rather] than to try to change everyone’s attitudes, for the
law is the most useful and deliberate instrument of change available to people.”118
The decade of re-discovery v the decade of challenge: the 90s
The picture of the world of law in the service of development by the end of the 1980s
was a far cry from the 60s and early 70s. The 80s are referred to as the ‘Lost Decade’
of development certainly as regards Africa but the same could be said of L&D. In one
area of the world – Asia – however, the 80s had seen the continuance of rapid
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economic growth but also a significant shift in the legal framework for this
development. This shift is of the first importance in understanding the trajectory of
L&D worldwide from the 90s onwards so some space must be devoted to it and the
work that explained and analysed it – Pistor and Wellons’s seminal work.119 Although
I assume that participants are familiar with the work, I will provide a brief summary
here as it forms an integral part of my paper.
Pistor and Wellons report on a major collaborative research effort sponsored and
funded by the Asian Development Bank into the role which legal systems played in
six Asian economies during a 35 year period of dynamic growth from 1960 to
1995120. The study is, as the authors say, the first of its kind in trying to investigate the
interaction between legal and economic change on a comparative basis. Within the
confines of this paper, only the bare bones of this important study can be set out:
Law played an important role in Asia’s remarkable economic growth during the
second half of the twentieth century. The results [of the research set out in the
book] suggest that far from being irrelevant, law made an important contribution
to Asia’s economic development and was most effective when it was congruent
with economic policies…Overall we suggest that law and legal institutions tended
to converge among the six economies and with the institutions of the West with
economic development…
The study focuses on the period from 1960 to 1995. Taking 1960 as a starting
point for our analysis is well justified when comparing economic growth rates
before and after 1960…
In contrast, legal development in the six economies would not, by itself, justify
starting our analysis in 1960. Legal modernization long predates the period of
dynamic growth and development. Nineteenth century Western imperialism
brought Western law to Asia by way of colonization or through the
comprehensive adoption of Western law by economies trying to protect their legal
sovereignty against Western powers. India and Malaysia came under colonial rule.
Japan modernized its legal system in the late nineteenth century using continental
European, in particular German law, as a model. Japan transferred this law to
Korea and the island of Taiwan when they came under its rule. China used various
models to modernize its legal system in the first decades of the twentieth century,
with particular emphasis on the Japanese/German models. When the PRC
embarked on a renewed legal reform effort after 1978, it further diversified and
copied from various economies with different legal systems…
Historical circumstances prevents us from simply relating legal modernization
to growth and development. We must content ourselves with an analysis of the use
of the existing legal framework as well as legal changes in the period when
economic development took off.
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By the early 1960s, all the economies but the PRC had comprehensive legal
systems in place which encompassed both public and private law…
Despite the absence of major formal law reform in most economies, the legal
systems changed significantly between 1960 and 1995. This change cannot be
captured by focusing only on the enactment or amendment of major codes. Legal
change over the 35 years was less visible because it often took place at the level of
administrative rule making or practice rather than the enactment of new major
codes. However, these changes had important implications for the functioning of
the laws that were already on the books.
To capture these shifts, we define law as a complex set of rules and institutions.
It consists not only of formal law enshrined in the constitutions, statutes or
precedents, but includes the legal practices that may or may not follow the formal
rules. To capture change in the legal system, we distinguish two dimensions of
legal systems, allocative and procedural. The allocative dimension determines
whether the power to make decisions over the allocation of resources is vested in
the state or is left to the market. The procedural dimension reflects whether
decisions are primarily rule based or discretionary…
When economic policies changed and provided greater scope for market
activities, as they did in most economies around 1980, market-based law became
more important. We found that throughout the 1980s market-allocative law gained
ground against state-allocative law in five of the six economies…
The trend away from state-allocative law that occurred in most economies
around 1980, in Japan about a decade earlier, was accompanied by greater
emphasis on rule-based as opposed to discretionary laws and legal processes.
Legal recourse against state acts was expanded or permitted for the first time…
This trend in the 1980s appears to mark a signal change in the Asian legal
tradition. State control has for centuries been a hallmark of the legal tradition in
East Asia and India…The remarkable act is the state’s choice after 1980 to
withdraw gradually from managing economic activity. This change has been
accompanied by greater emphasis on rule-based procedures, State officials were
made increasingly accountable to the law by limiting their discretionary power
and vesting non-state agents with the right to judicial review of administrative
acts.
Law and legal institutions in Asia changed in response to economic policies.
When economic policies were introduced that gave nonstate actors a greater role
in making allocative decisions, the law and its role in Asian economies became
increasingly similar to the West. Not only substantive laws, but also legal
processes and institutions responded to these changes, even though the process of
convergence with respect to the latter was much slower…
None of this suggests that Asia has already converged with the West in its legal
arrangements or that it will do so in the near future. The comparative analysis of
different legal systems in Asia has revealed remarkable differences even between
Asian legal systems. One may argue that in some ways these differences have
become even more apparent during the process of socioeconomic transformation.
As countries go through a similar development process, county-specific factors
that shape the path of socioeconomic development are being revealed. In this
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diversity, Asia’s growth experience largely resembles the different paths of
economic and institutional change taken historically in the West, where substantial
differences in legal systems and the structure of economies remain to this day…
A key finding of this research project therefore is that law and legal institutions
should not be viewed as technical tools that once adopted will produce the desired
outcome…This finding cautions against the blind transplantation of legal
institutions without due consideration for the relevant economic framework within
which they shall operate. It also suggests that law reform projects should be
assessed not in isolation, but within a broader context of economic policies.
Finally this conclusion calls for a closer interaction between policymakers and
legal reformers as well as between policy and legal advisers in designing legal
reform projects.121

These programmes of economic and legal reform were essentially internal exercises.
There may have been external advice and some transplants during the process but the
driving force for change was internal rather than imposed from the outside. I would
like to suggest that these reforms were one of the key influences in the resurrection of
the practice of L&D in the 90s. In the late 80s and early 90s, the East Asian miracle
of ‘developmental states’ was held out as the model for successful development122.
The academic studies that were undertaken of the secrets of these states and their
development did not specifically mention the role of law so that the Pistor and
Wellons study was providing a valuable addition to the fund of knowledge about
what contributes to successful development.
It is however significant both that the ADB funded the Pistor and Wellons study and
that the World Bank study The East Asian Miracle published in 1993 did, albeit
briefly, refer to the East Asian states being more successful in creating a legal and
regulatory environment conducive for private sector development123. This was
coupled with the importance of building a reputable civil service and developing
institutions which facilitated communication and cooperation between the public and
private sectors “whereby rent-sharing rules can be made transparent and whereby
each participant can be assured of a share of rents.”124 Transparency, probity, rules
which facilitate the operation of the private sector – these are the key determinants of
the push for good governance which have been the driving force behind the renewed
interest and faith in the efficacy of legal reform which became a characteristic of the
external input into L&D in the 90s. There was then a reversal of the age old format of
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Northern input into Southern legal reforms: good governance in the developing world
has at least in part been driven by Southern legal reforms, albeit mediated and
subtlety changed through Northern IFIs and donors before being passed on.
There were however other factors at work which were pushing IFIs, donors and the
developing world in the direction of a much greater emphasis on the role of law in
development. A key term here that came into vogue as the 1990s dawned is
‘enablement’ – a neo-liberal concept which aimed to capture the restructuring of the
relations between the state and civil society. In order however to make sense of
enablement, it needs to be broken down into three parts – market enablement;
political enablement and community enablement. In making this distinction, I follow
the framework developed by The Challenge of Sustainable Cities125 . From a legal
perspective, the first two elements of enablement are important.
Market enablement involves the withdrawal of the state from the provision of many
goods and services; i.e., in the urban sector, housing and utility services, the provision
of which should be privatised. It involves deregulation, particularly of the market for
land and of the use of land since attempts to regulate and control land supply and use
via state bureaucracies stifle initiatives, limits competition, increases costs and
contributes to corruption. Governments should be confined to facilitating and
promoting the formal and informal business sectors and markets and monitoring their
performance; legal, institutional and financial arrangements should be put in place to
achieve this. Governments should contract with the private sector via competitive
tendering for the provision of goods and services, rather than supply them
themselves.
Political enablement involves the transformation of the structure and functions of
central and local government, the relations between them and their relations with the
market and the community. It is achieved through decentralisation at both political
and administrative levels, democratisation, managerial and institutional reforms, the
use of NGOs for governance functions, particularly in the delivery of services and the
adoption of enablement strategies towards the market for urban goods and services as
already outlined. But there is more to it. The reasons for political enablement are
similar to market enablement; centralised governments are inefficient, inequitable,
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prone to rent-seeking behaviour, proliferate overlapping agencies and lack
accountability. Equally however local governments are also inefficient,
unaccountable, and lack financial resources and discipline so political enablement is
also directed to rolling back the local state. Powers are to be decentralised but they
would also be restructured to emphasise the enablement approach.
The connection between enablement and legal reform came about from two directions
which impacted on the market and governance aspects of enablement. The market
breakthrough came from the collapse of the command economies in Central and
Eastern Europe and in the CIS; the governance breakthrough came from the internal
and external pressures on governments in Africa to democratise themselves. In the
first case, it quickly became apparent that the whole legal edifice of the command
economy erected by communist regimes had to be replaced by…a legal edifice of a
market economy. Policy guidelines were not enough; they had to be backed up by
what market economists and World Bank personnel had hitherto taken for granted –
law; so law reform began to feature very strongly in all programmes of external aid in
what are referred to as the Transitional Countries.
In the second case, the drive towards democratisation in Africa often took the form of
new constitutions, the introduction of Bills of Rights into existing constitutions,
reform of electoral laws to facilitate multi-party political activity and elections and the
introduction of new or more effective means of redress of grievances against unlawful
government action. To this must be added the impact of structural adjustment to
African economies; whereas at first, the thrust of external pressure to reform
economies was to remove constraints on the operation of the market, i.e., remove,
inter alia, legal constraints, by a transference of experience from the Transitional
Countries, it soon became apparent that structural adjustment would entail legal
reforms as well. Furthermore, this would not just be narrow legal reforms to improve
the operation of the market; it would need to be wholesale reforms to the judicial and
legal systems.
Just as market reform has had a substantial legal reform component, so governance
reform has developed a very broad law input, but one which has, as aid agencies have
become more involved in law reform in the course of the 90s, become somewhat
detached from its internal political drive. Governance law reform under these external
pressures has taken on the hue of market-led law reform; governance law reform has
been as much about the protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts
as about the protection of human rights and access to justice for the poor – this again
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indicating the connection between law reform and economic development. The World
Bank in its publication Governance: The World Bank’s Experience made clear this
connection when it explained that
A legal framework for development…means a structure of rules and laws which
provide for clarity, predictability and stability for the private sector, which are
impartially and fairly applied to all, and which provide the basis for conflict
resolution through an independent judicial system.126

I turn once again to my own experiences to illustrate the development of the external
inputs into L&D during the 90s. In the early 90s I was working in UN-Habitat,
travelling the world as a UN official managing an international programme and
dispensing advice on land issues; in the latter half once again as a consultant but in an
environment changed quite distinctly from the earlier decades. In the last year of the
decade I worked again full-time as an aid official in Uganda advising on the
implementation of the Land Act, 1998 which I had helped draft.127
Although I was employed as a consultant on legal aspects of urban planning by
Habitat almost from its very beginning, I and others employed as legal consultants
were so as a response by Habitat and its predecessor, the UN Centre for Housing,
Building and Planning to government requests. Law was not a discipline which found
a place in UN-Habitat. Even when, in the research phase of the Urban Management
Programme, a joint Habitat/World Bank/UNDP initiative128, law featured in the
programme’s land management component129, it had no immediate impact on policy.
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Keynote urban policy documents produced by the World Bank130 and UNDP131 in the
early 90s made no reference to the role of law in the implementation of recommended
policies. Indeed, if anything there was a certain antipathy to law; law was seen as
synonymous with regulation, control and too much government and the early
approaches to what became the philosophy and strategy of enablement was hostile to
any ‘interference’ as it was seen then, to the market. Even the notion of ‘governance’
was frowned upon as being ‘political’ and therefore off limits for the Programme to
become involved in.132
By 1996, there was a significant turnaround in UN-Habitat. In June of that year, the
UN City Summit took place and out of it came the Istanbul Declaration and the
Habitat Agenda133, the latter being devoted to a Global Plan of Action (GPA) for
delivering adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements. What was very
striking about the GPA was the stress laid on the central role of law in its
implementation, particularly at the national level. In paragraph after paragraph stress
was laid on the need to review existing laws on land tenure, land transactions, housing
and urban planning, and develop simpler more user-friendly laws, providing equal
access to land for women, taking account of the needs of the urban poor and providing
specific opportunities for access to justice via legal aid and assistance.134 From that
time onwards, I have always made use of and quoted the stipulations in the GPA
when arguing for or suggesting legal policy prescriptions or drafting new laws on land
issues. Government officials are reluctant to ignore the principles and ideas in the
GPA (which they all signed up to) and my strike record has been better in the 90s than
in other decades.
In the 1990s, the content of my work changed. I was involved more in land tenure
issues than in land planning issues. Just as there had been a resurgence of interest in
L&D, so too there was a resurgence of interest in land reform and land law reform
amongst IFIs, donors and recipients of aid. There were various strands to this interest.
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Generally, part of the neo-liberal, structural adjustment, market enablement agenda
zeroed in on land and the need to free it from government controls so that it could be
obtained by those who would put it to its highest and best use – especially foreign
investors. More specifically, one of the keys to rapid economic growth amongst East
Asia countries to which attention had been drawn by several commentators including
the World Bank was successful land reform in Japan, Taipei China and Korea which
“helped lay the foundation of the rapid shared growth that has continued to elude the
Philippines” owing in part to the failure of land reform programmes there.135 The
World Bank became particularly committed to land reform. The Habitat Agenda and
the GPA played a role here too giving a social democratic slant to the imperatives of
the globalisation of land law reform in a market direction.136
There was another important change too in the nature of the work I became involved
in. During the 70 and 80s, my work on revising and writing new town and country
planning laws had generally been part of a UN-Habitat project to develop a new
national physical plan or urban plan or some such; there was a team of consultants
working in the project and the new law was a part of the total outputs of the project.
Although one was working with local counterparts, the work had an external feel
about it: the total package of plans, land use policies and laws was developed by the
UN team with local counterparts and local agencies being reactive. In the 90s and
thereafter, there were many more occasions when the fundamentals of policy or law
were developed internally by the government concerned and my role was to adapt and
develop land laws to implement those fundamentals. Two examples may be given in
some detail as they are also good illustrations of the internal politics of law making
which any analysis of the real world of L&D now has to grapple with.
I was involved in the drafting of two major land laws which gave the legal backing to
significant land reform policies in Tanzania and Uganda.137 In Tanzania, a
Presidential Commission on Land Matters was appointed in early 1991 and reported
in late 1992. The report was a major analysis and critique of existing policies,
practices and laws and recommended a thorough revision of the whole system with
considerably devolution to villages which would be given much greater powers over
‘their’ land. It also called for an overhaul of many of the land laws; the removal of
land management powers from the Ministry of Lands and, by a majority of 5 to 4, the
135
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creation of an independent Land Commission in which all land would be vested and
which would manage land on behalf of the nation.
The Commission’s appointment was very much resented by the Ministry of Lands
which considered that it was the chief policy adviser on land to the government.138
After the Commission reported, there was a period of two and a half years while the
struggle raged as to what would ultimately emerge as the government’s new land
policy. The ‘jewel in the crown’ of the Commission’s report was the independent
Land Commission; that was rejected, much to the chagrin of the chairman of the
Commission, but many of the other recommendations were accepted together with the
key recommendation of the World Bank driven policy process that it be accepted that
a land market existed in Tanzania and should be officially recognised and legislated
for. A new National Land Policy was approved by Parliament in June 1995 and at the
request of the Ministry of Lands, the British Government financed my involvement in
the drafting of the necessary laws to enable the new policies to be implemented.139
I worked with a four person team of Tanzanian lawyers throughout the drafting
process which also embraced two national workshops to consider the draft law. After
I submitted my draft in November 1996, the processes of consultation by the
government went on until the Bills – my draft had been sensibly split into two Bills
138
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and had undergone some changes– went to Parliament in October 1998 and were
enacted in February 1999. During their passage through Parliament, they were further
amended. A further two years elapsed while regulations and forms were drafted – I
was involved in that process too together with a Tanzanian counterpart – and an
important omission to the two laws was enacted.140
In Uganda, the background to the Land Act 1998 shows how internal political inputs
trumped external economic inputs. From the early 1980s, the World Bank had been
pressing successive Ugandan governments to replace the Land Reform Decree, 1975
with a law which adopted freehold tenure as the basic tenure system and admitted a
free market in land. Report after report was produced and Bill after Bill was drafted
but nothing came to the legislature. Then a Constitutional Commission was appointed
in 1992. The Commission sat for almost two years, touring the country widely to
obtain views on the most appropriate form of constitution for Uganda. Its report
together with a draft constitution was then subjected to a further detailed scrutiny by a
Constituent Assembly elected for the purpose. Land was a major issue both before the
Commission and in the Constituent Assembly. The Constitution had a detailed chapter
on land setting out what amounted to a new land policy: it provided that persons could
own land on any one of four legal bases: customary; freehold; mailo; and leasehold
and provided further for the decentralisation of land management, for local systems of
title registration and for specialist dispute settlement bodies.
These provisions were little short of revolutionary. The conferring of rights of
ownership on persons occupying land under customary tenure meant that such persons
were no longer customary tenants on public land, subject to the whims of officials
willing to grant that land to whomsoever they saw fit. Given that under the Land
Reform Decree, all land in Uganda was previously public land and even under the
Public Lands Acts and their predecessor Crown Lands Ordinances, all customarily
occupied lands were public lands, the effect of this provision was virtually to
eliminate public land as a category of land in Uganda. The tillers of the land became
the owners of the land able to influence any public management of it by the
devolution of management to District Land Boards and Parish Councils.
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The draft law had provided for a dedicated system of land courts as the national land policy had
recommended. The Government preferred to develop new District Land and Housing Tribunals which
would merge existing Customary Land Tribunals and Rent Tribunals and at the last minute changed the
Land Bill. Unfortunately apart from vesting exclusive jurisdiction in these new bodies, the relevant Part
of the Land Act, 1999 was silent on them. They were not established by the Act; their composition was
not set out; nor were their powers and duties; or the appellate structure. There was then a great hole in
the law. The problem was specifically drawn to the attention of the Ministry in April, 2000, but not
until the Land Courts Act, 2001 was the gap in the law filled.
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The Land Act was designed to put the flesh on the bare bones of the constitutional
principles. A first draft was published in September 1997 and so strongly criticised
that it was withdrawn and another draft published in March 1998. I was invited to
participate in a workshop on the Bill organised by a Uganda NGO for
Parliamentarians in late April – the date was put back by a month to accommodate the
visit of President Clinton to Uganda – which was designed to sensitise MPs and
launch a public debate on the Bill. I was asked to consider whether the Bill as drafted
was workable and provided adequately for accountability. My answer was that it was
not possible to say because the draft Bill was too vague, had too many open-ended
provisions that left it unclear who was to do what and with what effect, had provisions
that were virtually meaningless or did not appear to comply with the Constitution, and
did not provide adequate certainty for the rights being granted to the citizen. For my
sins I was invited to become involved in redrafting the Bill.141 I gave evidence to a
special Parliamentary select committee on the Bill and what was needed to improve
the draft. I worked closely with officials in the Ministry of Lands and the Chief
Parliamentary Draftsman and between us we put together a revised draft which was
acceptable to both government and Parliament – in Uganda, Parliament is much more
like the US Congress than the British Parliament in terms of its independence from
the executive – and the Bill was passed at the end of June, 1998.142
The processes of law making could not have been more different to those I was
involved in some 15 to 20 years ago both in those two countries and elsewhere. Then
there was no internal policy framework to work to; no counterparts to work with as a
part of a team; no public debate on legislative proposals; nor any real parliamentary
debate on Bills. Then legislative land law reform was a wholly external process; in the
1990s it had become an internal process to which I was privileged to contribute. The
laws that were finally put on the statute book had been through a political process in
which national policies had been developed which did not just follow donor and IFI
pressures; they were not universally approved143 – what policy and law is anywhere –
but their legitimacy was much greater than when they were externally driven. They
141

At the conference the Minister (a former student of mine) asked me if I would come and assist in a
redraft. I replied that he would have to talk to the UK Government DFID representative on that. He
then got up and announced that DFID had agreed that I should return to help with the redraft. DFID
graciously agreed to this shotgun arrangement.
142
S. Coldham, Land Reform and Customary Rights, (2000, 44 Jo. of Afr. Law) 64.
143
When in Uganda, I was invited by the former Attorney-General of Uganda (and a former colleague
of mine in the Law Faculty in Dar es Salaam) to have a drink with him at his club. The club turned out
to be the Uganda Freemasons Club and I was invited to reconsider those provisions of the Land Bill
which gave tenants rights against their landlords in mailo land in Buganda – the former A-G was a
Baganda. I declined.

62

aimed too not just to update colonial laws as with town and country planning but to
change economic, social and administrative behaviour and culture. They were in a
sense and unknowingly adopting the de Soto approach to law reform: adapting law to
the reality of land holding and land markets rather than continuing to try and ignore
how people were in fact using their land.
In the land law reform area then, although there were broad external pressures to
reform land policies and laws to facilitate the operation of a market for land, there
was, by the 90s, at least in some countries sufficient internal confidence and
competence to ensure that national concerns predominated in legal developments.
Even where no action was taken on recommendations for legal reforms, it was made
quite plain that it was national considerations which determined that course of (non-)
action. In Bangladesh for instance in 1999, I was advising on the reform of urban land
laws with a view to assisting the urban poor to access land. At a workshop to consider
the recommendations of my report144, while urban NGOs and some lawyers supported
the call for reform, a senior official opined that the urban poor would resist reform as
they welcomed being exploited; laws which facilitated their being exploited also
allowed them to exploit each other. No action followed the report – doubtless to the
great relief of the urban poor.
The 1990s saw not just a resurgence of L&D both in practice and in academia (and in
funding) but also an expansion of its scope. This was the decade when the World
Bank moved into high gear with its legal and judicial system reform programme. As
already noted, legal and judicial system reform had been operative in Latin America
from the 1980s with USAID taking the lead but in the 90s, the World Bank entered
the fray on all fronts, dragging many donors with it. The point has been made that:
By the late 1990s, approximately seventy-eight per cent of all conditionalities
imposed by the international financial institutions in loan agreements and
structural adjustment programmes were aimed at legal reform and the propagation
of ‘the rule of law’.145
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Tanzania was the first African country to get the treatment in 1994 when the Bank and
no less than five donors – Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and the
United Kingdom – piled in to prepare a series of reports on all aspects of the legal and
judicial system.146 The recommendations ranged from the ridiculous – that Tanzania
should build, with donor support, a huge Court of Appeal building similar to that in
Israel and Australia to emphasise the importance of the rule of law – to the mundane –
that law reports should be published.147 The final report had a shopping list of 658
recommendations but no prioritisation. Ten years on, many of the same donors were
prepared to fund another such study, so little had been achieved by the first. Indeed, it
was not at all clear that the institutional memory of the relevant donors could recall
their first inputs.148
Legal and judicial system reform as a component of governance reform, now
generally referred to as rule-of-law reform, creates both opportunities and challenges
for governments and L&D, both external and internal. To date, the record has been at
best mixed. It would be presumptuous for me to try and better, in a few sentences, the
analysis and conclusions contained in the Jensen and Heller volume149. Two
quotations from that volume however show that in many respects, L&D in practice
has not moved very far in 40 odd years:
Another characteristic unique to the area of judicial reform arises in what one
critic [Gawande150] calls the antiscientific bias in the legal culture…Three
characteristics – the absence of microeconomic diagnostics, the rejection of
experimental methods, and a reliance on advocacy – may well explain the lack of
progress in using experience to build and improve common strategies objectively.
Charges fly back and forth about the impact of reforms, but what passes as
evidence is short on rigor and long on anecdotes, illustrative statistics and
speculation [mea culpa!]…
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What needs to be done is obvious. Both donors and national counterparts have
to become more serious about articulating their strategies, specifying their
working hypotheses and evaluating program results.151
Most rule-of-law programs do not seriously consider why the link between laws
and legal institutions, on the one hand, and the normative behaviour of judges and
lawyers (and the public),on the other is so weak. Part of the answer, we would
argue, has to do with incentives. Because they focus on substantive law reform
and various training efforts, rule-of-law projects generally pay very little attention
to incentive structures and, hence, to the larger political economy of institutional
reform.152

The language may be different but the criticisms are the same as those made more
than 30 years ago: too many assumptions are being made that what works for ‘us’ will
work for ‘them’; too little attention is being paid to evaluative research; too little
attention is being paid to the real world of the law in the Other. Despite the lack of
clear focus in these projects, the authors do bring out very clear differences between
the approach of the World Bank and the approach of USAID and other aid agencies
and IFIs. USAID’s focus has been and remains on human rights and criminal justice.
DFID which was later into the field than USAID has also focused on criminal justice
but has moved now into the broader area of access to justice focusing generally on a
fair and equitable legal system which is prepared to embrace customary justice
systems.153 The World Bank however, “because of restrictions on its political
involvement…focuses instead on commercial and civil justice reform”154 and has as
its main potential client for its programmes, foreign investors.
A major new study lends support to the above criticisms of lack of attention to
evaluative research and calls into question one of the fundamental basis for legal
system reform.155 The study is concerned to determine how the dominant theory about
foreign investors and legal systems can be tested as a contribution to more effective
and useful legal system reform:
The dominant theory…proposes that foreign investors are attracted to states with
‘effective’ legal systems – that is those that are efficient and predictable, imposing
relatively low transaction costs on investors; and that they avoid states with
‘ineffective’ legal systems – that is, those which are inefficient and unpredictable,
151
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imposing relatively high transaction costs on investors…The analysis focuses
on…India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as these are the only countries in the region
that are covered by all the World Bank data sets… [which the author considers in
her paper].
It is clear that many points, fundamental and fine, about the relationship
between legal systems and FDI remain to be explored. We have a neat,
intellectually appealing theory. It is a shame that we do not have the facts to test it,
let alone support it…
Facts can be hard to find…
Facts can also be hard to face. For what it is worth, the ‘facts’ set out in this
paper seem to indicate that there is room for variety and even more room for
failure, in the pursuit of FDI through legal reform. There may not be a uniquely
effective legal system for all occasions and even if there were, it might be difficult
to identify. This may be hard for policy-makers to face for a number of reasons.
First, the idea that effective legal systems can be identified with mathematical
rigour satisfies the policy-maker’s need for visible targets; and provides the hope
of fulfilling the need for visible change…Secondly, the idea that there is one
model for an effective legal system satisfies the economist’s desire for
generalisable theories: design one, sell it often. Finally, and neo-imperialistic
conspiracy theories aside, the idea that Western legal systems are the most
effective satisfies the need (whether internal or external) for the World Bank to
introduce the importance of notions such as democracy, without being accused of
stepping into the forbidden territory of politics.156

The two authors quoted from the Jensen and Heller book noted and bemoaned the
lack of empirical work to support rule-of-law projects. The importance of this study is
that it has examined the empirical work that has been undertaken under the auspices
of the World Bank and has found it wanting. It also pinpoints the dangers of the kind
of work that Hammergren at least seems to want – microeconomic diagnostics, and
the dangers of holistic legal system reform which is now seems to feature in virtually
all donor aid programmes.
There are two more concerns that may be noted about holistic legal system or rule-oflaw reform programmes. It is not just that they are repeating the mistakes of the early
L&D programmes in Latin America; it is that the World Bank programmes are, as
Perry -Kessaris points out, trying to develop a ‘one size fits all’ model of legal system
and in so doing are going ‘back to the future’ with a vengeance, and this when there is
a wealth of literature to indicate the fallacy of so doing. Very instructive here are the
two editions of Lord Hailey’s An African Survey157. In the first edition, in the chapter
discussing the Administration of Justice, the author notes that his “general outline of
156
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what may be described as the ‘colonial’ court system would hold good for the greater
part of British colonial Africa” and the same applied to the French system of justice
française and justice indigène with the latter being the sole agency for the
administration of justice to Africans and based on a European rather than an African
model.158 There was then a standard model of the colonial legal system.
In the second edition, some twenty years on, the same chapter commences with a brief
summary of the evolution of Indian law in colonial times where the point was made
that when, in the 19th century, legal reforms began to be introduced into India, “the
Administration preferred to issue local regulations suited to Indian conditions, rather
than to reproduce in India the forms of English law” with the author going on to draw
the moral that with the scope of legislation “passing beyond the rudimentary purpose
of maintaining order…to effecting improvement in the economic and social
conditions of the country” it would be necessary to have regard to African
conceptions of justice and “begin by inquiring how far we can use them as part of the
foundation on which new African institutions can be built up.”159 So by the end of the
colonial system in Africa in the late 50s, the lessons of the British in India a century
or more earlier were beginning to be applied when law reform was being considered.
If there were still any doubt in the matter, the Pistor and Wellons study should have
set them at rest; common principles may have taken from Western legal systems but
they were adapted in practice to the particular circumstances of the countries
concerned.
Not content with such an approach, the Bank seems to be trying to apply its own
brand of imperialism not just to the specific projects it is funding but to the whole
field of legal system reform. Consider this modest claim for the collection of papers
from a conference held in Washington in June 2000, advanced by the Acting Chief
Counsel, Legal and Judicial Reform, at the Bank, Maria Dakolias:
While similar conferences have been held before, they have tended to have a more
limited regional or thematic focus. We believe this was the first time a truly global
symposium united practitioners and experts in legal and judicial development in
its multiple forms and in the broadest cross-disciplinary sense.160
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So much for over 40 years of conferences, workshops, symposia, on the themes of law
and development.
The re-discovery of law by IFIs and donors in the 90s is like the ‘discovery’ of
America, Asia and Africa by Europeans in 15th to 19th centuries: it was always there;
it was just that ‘we’ hadn’t noticed it and when we did notice it, it was some time
before we realised just how extensive it was.161 The re-discovery, as has been noted,
had, at least for some intrepid explorers, another similar characteristic to the earlier
explorers: a disinclination to accept that the many of the rules found there were worth
very much. Unlike the colonised of yore, however, the current governments and
peoples of the South have been able and willing to take on the challenges posed by the
agendas of North. I have already noted how at least in the countries I worked in
during the 90s – a not wholly untypical sample – while there may have been external
pressures for land reform, the configurations of that reform – the policies which were
arrived at (or not arrived at) and the laws which followed the policies – reflected the
internal political dynamics of the countries concerned and not the external concerns of
IFIs and donors.
So it was too with law reforms designed to re-establish competitive party politics,
protection of human rights, and other aspects of good governance. In Anglophone
Africa, there is little doubt but that the South African constitutional reforms of the
early 90s culminating in the Constitution of 1996 has had a major influence on
constitutional developments in the continent. As has been pointed out by Klug162,
although the climate for the kind of constitution which was finally agreed upon in

is in fact correct in its own terms. The conference was not global but covered the world within the de
facto lending mandate of the World Bank – the world of developing and transitional economies. The
collection consists of 24 papers: 7 dealt with African issues – 5 sub-Saharan and 2 North African; 4
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South Africa was influenced by the globalisation of the rule of law, the exact terms of
the constitution were the product of South African inputs. So too with Uganda’s
constitution in 1996 and Nigeria’s in 1999. Changes too to the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights reflected as much internal African political dynamics as
external pressures.
In Asia too, while global pressures no doubt contributed to constitutional and rule-oflaw reforms, the specific developments which took place reflected local internal needs
and pressures even if this meant delay in or withdrawal of financial assistance from
IFIs. I witnessed this at first hand in Indonesia in 2002.
With the collapse of the centralised authoritarian Soeharto regime in 1998, there were
strong demands for greater regional autonomy as an aspect of the democratisation of
government. A Regional Autonomy Act was enacted in 1999163 which provided for
extensive decentralisation of powers to around 300 sub-provincial regions (District
Regions ands City Regions) which were to be autonomous. Amongst the functions
which became “mandatory” for regions to handle was land affairs (undefined). Until
the passage of that Act, land management had been centralised in the National Land
Agency (BPN) and administered in accordance with the principles of the Basic
Agrarian Law (BAL).
BAL is of fundamental importance in two ways: for what it is and for what it says.
What is meant by the first point is that BAL has, in a sense, taken on a life of its own:
it has risen above what it says – its content – and its formal legal status – a Law
enacted by the national legislature – and has taken on an iconic status as a part of the
fundamental basis of the nation – it helps define and cement the Unitary State of
Indonesia as proclaimed in the Constitution of 1945. BAL has become not just the
policy but a policy which cannot be changed. This is particularly evident at the
present time in relation to the decentralisation of governmental functions over land in
pursuance of Law 22/99.
The fundamental principle of BAL is the abolition of the dualistic system of land law
prevalent in colonial times and its replacement with a land law providing for a single
system of rights based on adat law, but an adat law modified by principles introduced
by BAL. At the risk of some over-simplification, one way of putting it is to think in
terms of the State replacing the traditional institutions which managed land under adat
law. Adat law recognises that individuals within the local community can have rights
163
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to occupy and use land potentially in perpetuity but these rights remain subject to
overriding community interests, and some land within the jurisdiction of the
traditional authorities is reserved for communal use. So too now at the level of the
State. The State has a right, or more accurately, a duty of control over all land in the
national interest. This duty of control is distinct and separate from ownership of the
land; it derives from the sovereignty of the State over the territory of Indonesia.
Since 1998, when decentralisation has been official government policy and there has
been much legislation to provide for it, the national land management agency, BPN
has fought against decentralisation of land administration to the point that the World
Bank has made it clear that no new land administration project will be sanctioned (and
a proposed project was a $70 million one) until this issue is resolved. With
government as a whole having second thoughts about the destabilising effects (as it
sees it) of decentralisation, it would not be beyond possibility that BPN will win its
fight to rein in decentralisation of land administration and the Bank will either have to
accept that or forgo its ability to continue to try and influence the evolution of land
management in the direction of individualised registered land titles. BAL will not be
rewritten.
It is not just actions that we need to have regard to. One of the most striking and
pleasing developments in the scholarship of L&D in the 90s has been the very rapid
growth of L&D work by scholars from the South, often now writing in the law
journals of the North. There have always been outstanding legal scholars from the
South writing on L&D themes – Baxi, Ghai, Shivji from the Anglophone world spring
to mind – who, like Bob Marley and Freddy Mercury164, came from the South, were
based in the South and became truly international stars in a Northern dominated
industry. But the 90s have seen these stars joined by others who have a distinctive
voice and viewpoint, not always sympathetic to the increasingly dominant rule-of-law
market-orientated ideology of Northern L&D scholarship and reform. It might be
invidious to single out any particular author but in the context of this paper and its
argument, I would draw attention to Chibundu’s165 critique of current trends in L&D
thinking and practice:
One of the more remarkable features of the current debate over the role of law in
development is the persistence of a positivistic description of law. Ignoring many
of the most useful insights about law in the last three decades, positivist adherents
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continue to present law in terms of governments prescribing appropriate rules to
regulate title and transference of interests in property; the provision of functioning
institutional processes and mechanisms by which disputes may be resolved; the
existence of an efficient bureaucracy to entertain and process requests; and the
provision of the assurance of transparency in the conduct of all these functions.
For each one of these elements of law, one can usually point to a model
illustration from a Western developed society…
The instrumentalist approach to the study of law and development is underpinned
by an assumption of a unilinear relationship between law and development in
general and law and economic development in particular… The purported
relationship of law to development is however no more than surmise. Stripped to
its essence, it is a culturally determined argument for policies likely to encourage
participation by investors from Western Europe and North America in the
economies of the Southern countries…
Now that the globe seems to be marching to one drum beat, that of the free
enterprise capitalist system, it follows that the legal institutions and practices that
have fostered and sustained the triumph of the capitalist mode of production…are
best suited for other societies, appropriately modified at the margins to account for
the particular foibles of those societies. Not surprisingly then, the apostles, priests
and lay missionaries of law, as typically understood and practiced in the
industrialized countries, have fanned out to all corners of the globe, preaching the
gospel of clear individual title to property rights, a functioning judicial system to
adjudicate such rights…judicial review of administrative and legislative
action…and a minimalist approach to regulation by the state. Although often
clothed in the garb of international law, the scripture is simply one of a
particularized global standard to be implemented within national territories.
The central point about law and development is that economics and political
science are part of the same cultural environment within which persons and
institutions interact. Both seek an expansive understanding of those interactions,
and similarly attempt to shape those interactions. The starting point of reference
must be that the study of reflexive influences of law on development, the impact
of individuals on institutions, the engagements of the state with society, and
society with the state, are not likely to be of much use unless they are undertaken
within the living cultural settings of the society under study.
Ultimately, the particular day-to-day existence of people, their struggles for scarce
resources, the availability and abundance of social distractions, and the internecine
quest for power and dominance, motivate and channel the structure and principles
of a legal order, as well as socio-economic and political development. It is these
considerations that ought to dictate the nature and direction of future inquiries into
law and development.
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It may be argued that this approach is not particularly original and that, published in
an American law journal, it will have limited impact on either scholarship or practice
in the South. It is however symptomatic of more critical thinking amongst legal
scholars of the South (and similar articles can be found in law journals of the South)
which will help provide the intellectual support for the national internal responses to
the challenges posed by the external Northern rediscovery of L&D. There is, as has
been noted by many legal166 and other167 scholars great pressure for the globalisation
of law reform – the homogenisation of diverse national laws into a common standard
form which is in practice an Anglo-American form – civil law seems to be losing out
here – but my experience, limited though it has been, and the sceptical scholarship of
Chibundu and his colleagues suggests that there may be sufficient confidence in the
internal L&D communities to ensure that national interests are properly catered for
even when external pressures are applied.
The decade(s) (?) of recolonisation: the 00s
If the 90s were the decade when law as an important input into development was
rediscovered, the 00s may be the decade when colonisation re-appears as an important
driving force behind ‘development’ and development in turn is seen much more
crudely as modernisation. Let me make quite clear what I mean by colonisation. It can
take various forms. At its worst and most overt, it is the conquest and forcible
occupation of another country under colour of international law on the grounds that
that other country has ‘failed’ and is incapable of managing itself; or its management
offends the accepted norms of international law; or it poses a threat to the
international community. Alternatively, as with protected states of old, forcible
occupation by conquest may be averted by an ‘agreement’ to be, in effect, supervised
by a colonial power or powers and again as with the old League of Nations/UN
system of mandates and trusteeships168, the UN may be brought in to give a veneer of
respectability to the whole exercise.
Sometimes, the exercise is beneficent: there can be few people outside Indonesia (and
not a few inside) that do not think that the process whereby East Timor became
independent was wholly justifiable. (It was in any event, to undo a flagrantly illegal
colonial occupation of an independent country). Effective armed intervention of a
166
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fairly modest scale has greatly assisted Sierra Leone to recover from complete
collapse. Without armed intervention in some of the states that used to make up the
former Yugoslavia, there would have been much worse killing than in fact occurred.
Sometimes, there is general consensus that there should have been armed intervention
and a follow up period of supervised administration – Rwanda is a case in point – or
more effective armed intervention – Liberia, and, for some commentators,
Afghanistan to combat warlordism. There have been situations where some kind of
armed intervention or at least international quasi-armed intervention has been sought
but denied – Palestinian requests for international assistance to combat the illegal
Israeli occupation and destruction of Palestine is the most obvious example of that.
The exercise can however be contested both within the international community and
more important within the country concerned: Iraq is the obvious example here. One
wonders too whether the restoration of civil order in Haiti under a government
acceptable to the US which orchestrated the downfall of the Aristide government will
proceed entirely peacefully and the latest flare-up in Kosovo shows that any possible
solution there – independence, autonomy, partition, integration – will be contested on
the ground and may therefore lead to further armed intervention and/or international
occupation and supervision.
A more politically correct description of the kind of practices I see as old fashioned
colonialism is to use the term ‘failed states’ to described the occupied/supervised
entities so that the term ‘international assistance’ can then be used to describe the
activities of the occupiers/supervisors. ‘Failed states’, by focusing on the ‘facts’ ex
post neatly avoids any investigation of who or what caused the failure ex ante in the
first place. It also has two other ‘external’ advantages. First, a state that has ‘failed’
has done so because of the failures of the people managing or rather mismanaging the
state: they can therefore be pushed aside and allow others to take over; either external
administrators and e.g. lawyers or internal people who owe their position, status and
power (such as it is allowed to be) to the external powers; Mr Karzai, the ‘Mayor of
Kabul’169 is an example of that. Second, a failed state needs to be rebuilt from top to
bottom: enter the international community with, inter alia, rule-of-law programmes,
governance programmes, market-orientated law reform programmes as essential parts
of an all-singing-all- dancing programme of state capacity building. Just as in the era
of European empires so brilliantly analysed by Abernathy170, so now: law is seen as a
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central pillar in the creation of new states which conform to the international
community’s notion of what a state is and how it should be governed.171
For the L&D community, is there not a cruel dilemma: do we participate in nation
building exercises when to do so is necessarily to accept, at least implicitly, the
ideology of colonialism which has facilitated our opportunity to so participate; or do
we decline to participate and watch others, perhaps less attuned to the intricacies and
delicacies of legal interventionism and more committed to serving the interests of the
colonial powers plunge in, make fools of themselves (or so we will write later) and
leave a legal mess behind? Perhaps the dilemma is more apparent than real: to assist
in East Timor (as I have done on the margins) is not to condone the illegal invasion
and occupation of Iraq. Arguably, to become involved in land reform efforts in
Afghanistan (as at the time of writing I may be invited to become involved in) which
many authoritative persons see as a key to the re-establishment of a viable peaceful
society in that country172 is to try and assist in repairing the damage done by more
than two decades of externally directed armed intervention and civil war,
notwithstanding that one will be making an external intervention at the behest of a UN
agency rather than the Government of Afghanistan.
Rather than inventing another term, let us, notwithstanding its limitations, use the
term ‘failed states’ as a superficially objective term in order to explore not whether
the L&D community should become involved in such states but on what basis and
according to what principles. What should we be aiming to achieve in our
intervention, whether it is at the grand level of constitution-making and or at the more
humble levels of land reform and criminal justice reform? Is there, even, or especially,
in an era of the re-assertion of the ideologies that might is right and colonialism is
justifiable a place for an alternative perspective that the L&D community should both
argue for and apply in the field? Two recent lines of argument suggest a way forward.
The first comes from the Nobel Prizewinner in economics, Amartya Sen:
It is important to give simultaneous recognition to the centrality of individual
freedom and to the force of social influences on the extent and reach of individual
freedom. To counter the problems that we face, we have to see individual freedom
as a social commitment…
Expansion of freedom is viewed, in this approach, as both the primary end and
as the principal means of development. Development consists of the removal of
171
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various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little
opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency. The removal of substantial
unfreedoms, it is argued here, is constitutive of development…The intrinsic
importance of human freedom, in general, as the pre-eminent objective of
development is strongly supplemented by the instrumental effectiveness of
freedoms of particular kinds to promote freedoms of other kinds…
This work outlines the need for an integrated analysis of economic, social and
political activities, involving a variety of institutions and many interactive
agencies. It concentrates particularly on the roles and interconnections between
certain crucial instrumental freedoms, including economic opportunities, political
freedoms, social facilities, transparency guarantees, and protective security.
Societal arrangements, involving many institutions (the state, the market, the legal
system, political parties, the media, public interest groups and public discussion
forums, among others) are investigated in terms of their contribution to enhancing
and guaranteeing the substantive freedoms of individuals, seen as active agents of
change, rather than as passive recipients of dispensed benefits.173

The second is from an original perspective on the ‘norm of democratic governance’
which is ‘emerging’ in international law and which in the view of some international
legal scholars ‘would require ‘democratic countries [to] do everything possible to
promote democracy in the world’ including military intervention.174 Marks considers
that the sceptics of this claim for the existence of a new norm are right to warn that
the risk of neo-imperialism looms large (events since she wrote this show the
correctness of this view):
On the other hand, I do not accept the conclusion drawn by some, that the attempt
to secure explicit international legal support for democratic agendas should
therefore be dropped. I think the proponents of the norm are right to bring
democracy into the vocabulary of international law…
My concern is with the implications of the claim that an emerging norm of
democratic governance should now be recognised…my concern is with the
relation between that claim and prevailing power. I seek to consider the
democratic norm in terms of its potentials both for sustaining relations of
domination and for transforming them.
I do not share the view…that democracy is a Western form of government, with
little pertinence in other parts of the world, and hence little place in international
law…as Claude Ake remarks, ‘[t]here is no part of the world where democracy is
not relevant, if only as an emancipatory project.’ The reference here…is to the
basic democratic ideas of popular self-government and political equality…
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Insofar as democracy offers a powerful argument against domination, the
critique of ideology affirms the importance of holding onto that argument. This
translates into a claim that the democratic ideals of self-rule and political equality
must not be wasted. ‘Realism’ must not be allowed to corrode them; statism must
not be allowed to confine them; scepticism must not be allowed to overwhelm
them…[They] must not be reduced to any particular set of institutions and
practices. Instead they must be permitted to retain their character as tools for
criticizing actuality and orienting change.
International law should not seek to establish democracy as the solution to the
question of constitutions. But neither should it baulk at the prospect of asserting
democracy’s universal significance.175

Starting from different perspectives and concerned with different ends, there is a
striking similarity in the arguments put forward here. Development is about
expanding political as well as economic freedoms and should be people-centred.
Democracy too should be seen as being about the expansion of freedom and equality
and likewise, as a consequence, people-centred. The state and the law should not be a
vehicle of domination either in the national or in the international sphere. It should
enable and facilitate people-centred development.
Such an approach to development and law – international and national – is
incompatible with colonialism; or with rule-of-law programmes which seek to focus
solely on investor-friendly legal systems; or with “the restructuring of the legal
functions of the state [which] serves to aggravate existing inequalities and social
exclusion” and “reflect the more general features and effects of the neo-liberal state:
the privatisation of state functions, increased inequalities and a reduced institutional
capacity to intervene in society to address those inequalities.”176; or with the kind of
unregulated market-centred land law reforms geared to the individualisation of tenure
which the World Bank continues to urge on countries and from the latest evidence, is
again gearing up to impose on countries.
On the other hand, such an approach would not rule out external inputs into national
programmes of L&D which involved working with local counterparts, developing
legal system reform packages that put access to justice for the poor at the centre of the
programme, ensuring that equity was as central to land law reform packages as
efficiency and that constitution-making and the development of local government
175
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emphasised participation and rights for the people and accountability and control of
governmental powers. These may be old-fashioned examples of legal liberalism but,
to adapt Claude Ake’s aphorism, there is no part of the world where the principles of
legal liberalism are not relevant, if only as an emancipatory project.
Let me give one last example from my own work. During 2003, I was in Somaliland
on a UN-Habitat project working with the Mayor and councillors of Hargeisa to
develop a new local government law for the city.177 For most people, and certainly I
would suspect most Americans, the ‘S’ word is the very definition of a failed state and
one that, having spurned the beneficent intervention of the US marines in the early
1990s, deserves little support or sympathy now. But Somaliland is not Somalia. A
brief introduction to the country and its developmental trajectory to the present is in
order. 178
Somaliland became a British protectorate in 1887. It was never particularly well
regarded by the British nor did it benefit from much development assistance during its
dependency. Law and order – the first concern of a colonial power – were not fully
established until the early 1920s179.
Somaliland was granted its independence by Britain on 26 June 1960. Five days later,
it voluntarily and, at the time enthusiastically, voted to merge its independence with
the newly created Somali Republic which came into being on 1 July 1960180. After a
promising beginning, the Republic of Somalia succumbed to a military coup in 1969
and one of the most ruthless and vicious dictators to emerge in Africa took control of
Somalia – Siad Barre. Despite (or perhaps because of) his record of tyranny, of
demonstrating that he was a ‘strong ruler’, he received large amounts of aid from the
USA, happy that in the late 1970s, he fell out with his former paymaster, the USSR,
177
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over his war with Ethiopia. Eventually, the Somalis rose up against Barre and taking
the lead in this in the late 1980s were the Somalis from the North-West, the old
Somaliland, who had become increasingly disenchanted with the discrimination
practiced against them by Southern Somali dominated governments.
The reaction of Barre towards the Northern Somalis was immediate and horrendous.
He set out to slaughter as many of them as possible and destroy their towns. Hargeisa,
the largest town in the North-West was bombed by Barre’s air force based in Hargeisa
and shelled by his army. Enormous destruction and loss of life took place. Over
50,000 people lost their lives; countless others were injured and lost their homes and
all their possessions. Eventually the people triumphed; Barre and his forces were
expelled from the North-West and at the beginning of 1991, Barre was chased away
from Somalia.
The people of the North-West had had enough. In May, 1991, at a conference of the
Somaliland Communities at Burao, they reaffirmed their independence with effect
from 18th May.181 From that time onwards, Somaliland has regarded itself as an
independent state and the citizens of that state have set about the process of rebuilding
their state and nation. Without any recognition from any other state in the world
community, and relying overwhelmingly on their own resources, principally in the
form of remittances from the diaspora of Somalianders which now amount of some
$450 million a year, they are doing a remarkable job.
It has not been easy. For the first few years, warlords both within Somaliland and
from outside were a constant threat. But the government persevered. Gunmen have
been disarmed. Now only the police in Hargeisa carry weapons. Peace and security
have been restored throughout the land. Only a border dispute with Puntland – another
unrecognized breakaway state in the North-East of Somalia – threatens the peace. As
one statistic of the astonishing transformation which has been brought about, 14 years
ago at the height of the civil war and general lawlessness, Hargeisa shrank to around
10,000 inhabitants. Today it has a population of over half a million and while there is
much poverty, there is little crime in the city.
A constitution has been adopted which provides for a President, a two chamber
Parliament, a Bill of Rights and an independent judiciary. The first President was
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Mohamed Egal, the leader of Somaliland at independence in 1960. When he died in
2002, it was widely assumed both within and outwith Somaliland that conflict would
break out over the succession. It did not. By the evening of the day of Egal’s death,
Somaliland had a new President; the Vice-President was elevated. Presidential
elections were held the following year and when the result was disputed by the
opposition who had lost by a mere 80 votes in a nation-wide poll, the matter was
resolved peaceably by the elders. Local governments have been re-established, local
elections held, services are beginning to be provided to the people and local taxes
collected. Disputes are being settled peaceably.
Colonial Somaliland was part of the common law system. Appeals from the
Somaliland High Court went to the Court of Appeal for East Africa which also
exercised appellate jurisdiction in Kenya, Tanganyika (as it was until 1964), Uganda
and Zanzibar. When Somaliland joined up with Somalia, a major exercise in ‘legal
integration’ commenced managed by an Italian team182. It would not be entirely unfair
to say that the integration consisted in large part of the application of Italianate codes
to Somaliland. The Penal Code for instance was drafted by an Italian lawyer in the
early 1960s and was applied throughout independent Somalia: it was and is (in theory
it still applies) a magnificent intellectual feat of no practical utility. Some of the old
colonial statute law continued to apply in Somaliland but during the Barre era was
slowly replaced by laws which owed little to specifically Italian influence.
There was a conscious and deliberate campaign by Barre to wipe out and destroy the
legal heritage of Somaliland. All the old British colonial collections of Somaliland
statute laws were destroyed, the law reports in the High Court were looted and
vanished. There are now no collections of any laws of any kind in Hargeisa183. Nor
are there any persons with drafting skills. But this has not prevented Somaliland from
basing their development on law.
What is clearly happening is that Somaliland is slowly and inevitably some false starts
– the laws on local government I was asked to comment on had had built into them
several flash points of conflict between central and local government, between mayor
and councillors and between councillors and officers which was partly a product of
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the universal ambivalence which central governments have over decentralising power
to local governments and partly just a badly drafted law184 – creating a new
autocthonous legal system, geared to meeting its own needs and principles.
The absence of international legal assistance is, paradoxically, helping in the
development of a truly national legal system, tailored to national needs. Nowhere is
this more the case than with dispute settlement. Disputes are handed almost
exclusively by customary principles and/or ADR. Yet it must be emphasized that this
is a society with a high level of commerce both national and international; with a
banking and money transfer system capable of handling many millions of dollars of
transactions having international elements and ramifications. Clearly the system
works and must be based to a large degree on trust and honour, the foundation of any
system of law.
Could it not be suggested that unlike the formal legal systems of so many states in
Africa, the evolution of a legal system which derives its fundaments and direction
from the culture and locally driven needs and decisions of the society in which the law
is to apply are a more likely guarantee of ‘law and order’ i.e. acceptance of the need to
observe and comply with the law, and so of development than the ambitious
programmes of legal system reform now being mounted by the World Bank and many
donors.
The people I met and worked with – councillors, officials, lawyers – were concerned
to create and work under a law which they could understand and which would have
resonance with the residents of the city: they had experienced the reverse and did not
want a repeat. Far from there being a ‘failed state’ a ‘black hole’ in the Horn of
Africa, there are people in Somaliland committed to building a state governed by law,
willing to work with external assistance but not in any way dependent on it and
determined to pursue their own way in a largely hostile world. Commentators have
said that Somaliland is a ‘challenge’ to the international community; it is in many
respects a threat for if it can succeed on its own and with minimal aid and this
example begins to be followed by other countries in the South, where is the leverage
over development and rule-of-law reform which the international community attempts
to exert over so many countries. No wonder there is resistance to the recognition of a
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state which complies with every traditional formal requirement for recognition of a
state in international law – a defined territory (the old British Somaliland
Protectorate); a government with the monopoly of force within the state; and the
support of the people.
Conclusions
My conclusions on this overlong paper are very tentative. They need more reflection
than I have had time to give them. I will state them baldly. First, L&D has a long
lineage; it is as old as empire. Law was a key tool in establishing colonies; in creating
colonial governments; in the dispossession of the aboriginal inhabitants of the
countries so acquired of their freedoms, their rights to labour as and when they saw
fit; and of their land and other possessions. What was L&D to invaders was D&L –
destruction and lawlessness – to invadees.
Given the history of L&D, the remarkable aspect of the post 1960s evolution is not
the re-discovery of law by IFIs and donors in the 1990s, but their dismissal of it for
almost 25 years from the 70s to the early 90s. How did they think their prescriptions
for developing countries were going to be implemented if not by law? It is perhaps an
extraordinary backhanded tribute to the School of the Death of L&D that their
arguments, though completely wrong, was so influential in practice.
The post-European empire evolution of L&D – post 1960 – can only be properly
understood if it viewed through external Northern ‘Us’ and internal Southern ‘Other’
prisms. While there have been overlaps and interconnections between the two, their
perspectives have been different; closest in the 1960s, they are now at the beginning
of the 21st century, arguably at their furthest apart as the North re-asserts empire –
domination via outright occupation or protectorate status or through globalisation– as
its raison d’être for legal reforms in the South and the South presses the claims of
autochthony in its response.
That said, it would be wrong to see the North and the South as two monolithic blocks.
There have always been scholars and practitioners of L&D in the North who have
seen their role not as latter-day empire builders but as co-workers and co-scholars
with colleagues in the South working to develop viable, legitimate legal systems and
bodies of law to further development which expand freedoms and remove unfreedoms
(to use Sen’s terminology) for all. Conversely, there are many in the political and
legal aristocracies of the South that are quite content to accept the dictates of IFIs and
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donors on legal system and other aspects of law reforms and turn these to their
advantage.
Liberal legalism as a set of principles has received an unfair press over the years. It
was criticised as providing the justification for some pretty back-handed attempts at
L&D inspired law reforms in the South in the 60s. This is to miss the essential worth
of a body of principles that can provide the legal frameworks for both the “process
aspect” (processes of decision making) and the “opportunity aspect” (opportunities to
achieve valued outcomes) of freedom which is or should be the organising principle
of development.185 Ake has stated: “There is no undemocratic country I know of
where democratic struggles are not being waged.”186 Are there likewise any
authoritarian countries where liberal legal principles a.k.a. the rule of law are not
being fought for? Consider this inspiring comment by a South African non-lawyer
who lived in a state where liberal legal principles were conspicuous by their absence:
There cannot be authentic democratisation and hence development without
adherence to, and respect for the rule of law. The law permeates every facet of
society, it is the glue that holds the apparatus of the state together and the latter
accountable to the people. Without it, lawlessness and corruption become endemic
and taint the cultural fabric of society. Only just and impartial institutions steeped
in the rule of law can revive a civic culture and turn victims, non-believers and
pessimists into CITIZENS. 187

It is this vision that both scholars and practitioners of L&D should aspire to in their
work.
Working in the field, advising governments and drafting policies and laws is
challenging, exciting, in a way humbling and usually very enjoyable.188 But looking
back over 40 years of L&D and notwithstanding being able to point to several fairly
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substantial Acts of Parliament which I drafted being on statute books dotted around
the world, I would not consider that work as being my most influential, most longlasting or providing the most positive good for the countries I have worked in. The
most worthwhile L&D work I have done was the first work I did: helping establish the
Faculty of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam and so laying the foundations for
the establishment of an indigenous legal profession using that term in its widest sense
of lawyers in all walks of life, and an indigenous legal culture in several countries in
East and Central Africa.
I would wholeheartedly endorse the many contributors of the Jensen and Heller
volume who “have long argued that more resources should be committed to legal
education.”189 As I noted earlier the arrival of law and lawyers as a distinct and
independent social force in many developing countries in the 1960s was the major,
irreversible and beneficial L&D input into the developing world. Where they already
existed as in India or Chile190 the impact of reforms in legal education has had an
equally beneficial effect on the quality and orientation of the legal profession. The
values of liberal legalism, of the rule of law as espoused by Mamphela Ramphele and
many others in the South are much more likely to become embedded in society
through the legal educational process than through any other process of legal system
reform.
Support for legal education is not high profile; is not going to produce quick results
and might be difficult at first sight to reconcile with a commitment to support legal
system reform to benefit the poor. One could however, argue that it’s the one L&D
input that brings together the external and the internal perspectives of L&D and the
one such input that is highly unlikely to fail: in every society there are some lawyers
who are concerned with justice, with freedoms and with advancing the rule of law. If
it does nothing else as a community, the L&D community should make it its business
to argue the case for support for legal education in the South and especially in ‘failed
states’ so as to develop as rapidly as possible that critical mass of national legal skills
and knowledge that is the only sure way to build up a national legal culture and so in
turn create the undergirding for a legitimate, effective and just national legal system.
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